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Popular Constitutional Argument
Tom Donnelly*
Critics have long attacked popular constitutionalists for offering few
clues about how their theory might work in practice—especially inside the
courts. These critics are right. Popular constitutionalism—as a matter of both
theory and practice—remains a work in progress. In this Article, I take up the
challenge of developing an account of (what I call) popular constitutional
argument. Briefly stated, popular constitutional argument is a form of
argument that draws on the American people’s considered judgments as a
source of constitutional authority—akin to traditional sources like text,
history, structure, and doctrine. Turning to constitutional theory, I situate
popular constitutional argument within contemporary debates over judicial
restraint, living constitutionalism, popular sovereignty theory, and
originalism. And turning to constitutional practice, I offer the interpreter a
concrete framework for crafting popular constitutional arguments—
cataloguing the various indicators of public opinion that have played a role in
recent Supreme Court decisions. These indicators include measures associated
with the president, Congress, state and local governments, the American
people’s actions and traditions, and public opinion polls. Throughout, I use
illustrative examples to show the various ways in which popular
constitutional argument already operates at the Supreme Court—appealing to
jurists from across the ideological spectrum. While this Article begins to
explore how popular constitutionalism might operate inside the courts, much
work remains.
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INTRODUCTION

Popular constitutionalism is simple to describe in theory, but
difficult to apply in practice. In theory, it is a gloss on America’s rule
of recognition—popular sovereignty.1 This concept is central to
1.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 74 (2d ed. 1994) (considering the American
electorate as an “extraordinary and ulterior legislature” bound to uphold the Constitution).
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America’s constitutional self-identity and is captured by some of the
central phrases in the American constitutional canon, including the
Preamble (“We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and
establish this Constitution”) and the Gettysburg Address
(“government of the people, by the people, for the people”).
In the United States, no single government official or level of
government is sovereign—not the president, Congress, the Supreme
Court, the government of New Jersey, or the Mercer County
Commission.2 Of course, the U.S. Constitution provides a framework
for government and includes some of the American people’s most
cherished rights, including free speech and religious liberty. The
Constitution also includes a formal amendment process. For the
Founding Generation, this mechanism ensured that the American
people could update their charter in a regular, orderly way—
correcting deficiencies, big and small, without recourse to violence or
revolution.
Many contemporary interpretive debates turn on how best to
read the Constitution’s text as it exists. For instance, what sorts of
laws violate the First Amendment’s protections for free speech or
religious liberty? How broadly does Article I’s commerce power sweep?
And what activities can the president carry out unilaterally under
Article II’s commander-in-chief power? These are important
interpretive disputes, and they often turn on which sources of
authority America’s rule of recognition identifies.
However, some disputes are more fundamental still—with
scholars debating whether the written Constitution remains the
ultimate source of constitutional authority or whether courts (and
officials) should recognize acts of popular sovereignty outside of it.
Most dramatically, these extraconstitutional acts might include a new
American Revolution—overthrowing the existing Constitution and
replacing it with a new one. However, these theoretical (and
historical) debates often turn on actions taken within the existing
constitutional system, transforming the Constitution’s meaning
outside of the formal Article V amendment process—often through
social movements, elections, public debates, judicial appointments,
landmark statutes, and transformative Supreme Court opinions.
For popular constitutionalists (and their key forerunners like
Bruce Ackerman), the core issue is popular sovereignty itself. For
these theorists, the key practical issue is how best to identify when the
2.
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–36 (1999) (“[N]o organ of the government is
authorized to speak in the name of the people.”).
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American people have spoken, determine what they have said, and
figure out how best to apply the American people’s commands in
concrete cases. In short, while Americans have long valued the role of
the Supreme Court in our constitutional system, popular
constitutionalists argue that the American people must play a central
role in constitutional development.
Even so, criticisms of popular constitutionalism abound, and
they are as obvious as they are plentiful. Some critics attack the
theory as vague.3 Others as meaningless.4 And still others as
dangerous.5 Each set of criticisms raises its own set of challenges for
popular constitutionalism.
Two questions remain: Can popular constitutionalism survive
this onslaught by its critics? And if it can, how might the theory work
in practice?
Popular constitutionalism is often associated with the most
virulently anti-court rhetoric of its proponents. For some popular
constitutionalists, judicial review must go.6 For others, judicial review
may stay, but, even then, the American people and their elected
leaders must be prepared to strike back against an aggressive
Supreme Court—at times, using blunt court-curbing measures like
jurisdiction stripping and court packing.7 This version of popular
constitutionalism—though frequently discussed—has managed to
attract few adherents due to its fixation with the Supreme Court and
judicial overreach. But courts could actually play a constructive role in
realizing
popular
sovereignty
today.
Judicial
popular
constitutionalism is one way of making popular constitutionalism
work.8
Even when popular constitutionalists turn to the courts for
help, challenges remain. For instance, how might a popular
constitutionalist interpret the Constitution? Should she rely on
3.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 656
(2005) (book review) (arguing that popular constitutionalist Larry Kramer failed to identify how
his theory might work in practice).
4.
See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1621 (2005) (book review) (“The idea that the people themselves are a
corporate body or organic unity is a fiction.”).
5.
Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular
Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, 690 (“Popular constitutionalism’s central flaw is its
failure to recognize that the protection of minorities and their rights cannot rely on the
majority.”).
6.
See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154 (1999).
7.
See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 249 (2004).
8.
See Tom Donnelly, Judicial Popular Constitutionalism, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 541
(2015) (book review).
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judicial restraint?9 Moments of heightened popular sovereignty?10 The
results of the most recent opinion poll? Patterns of popular lawmaking
at the national, state, and local levels?11 The specific contours of
popular constitutional analysis remain underexplored, but some
scholars have made a start.
One strand of scholarship discusses the normative tradeoffs of
using public opinion as an explicit part of constitutional analysis.12
For instance, Richard Primus argues, “[T]he strongly held view of the
public is sometimes an ingredient of the right answer to a
constitutional question, just like text, precedent, history, structure,
social science, and normative theory.”13 While conceding that popular
authority remains “controversial” within constitutional theory, Primus
adds that this form of analysis may promote important values like
“democracy, the rule of law, and public identification with the
regime.”14 At the same time, Primus acknowledges that popular
constitutional analysis still awaits a comprehensive framework (and
defense).15
Another strand of scholarship studies the relationship between
the Supreme Court, the elected branches, and the American people.16
9.
See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
10. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
11. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1945
(2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism]; Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027,
1032 (2004) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Departmentalism].
12. See Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They? A Response to If People Would Be Outraged by
Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 213, 215 (2007); Richard Primus, DoubleConsciousness in Constitutional Adjudication, 13 REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 2–3 (2007) [hereinafter
Primus, Double-Consciousness]; Richard Primus, Response, Public Consensus as Constitutional
Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2010) [hereinafter Primus, Public Consensus].
13. Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 2.
14. Id. at 7, 9.
15. See Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1218 (conceding that he has been
unable to offer a “complete exposition of this perspective”); see also Coan, supra note 12, at 237
(describing his own account as a “preliminary sketch”).
16. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD 1 (2011) (exploring the “attitude members of the public must have toward the
constitutional project in order for it to be legitimate”); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING
OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE
COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–83 (2001); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1345 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, De Facto]; Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192 (2008)
[hereinafter Siegel, Dead] (discussing two possible explanations for the Heller decision, each of
which turns on the opinions of the American public in a different era).
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These scholars argue that the Supreme Court’s decisions often track
public opinion—whether because of the Supreme Court nomination
process, social movement activism, public challenges to the Court’s
authority, court-curbing measures in Congress, or changes in the
attitudes of the Justices themselves. This scholarship establishes that
public opinion may exert some control on constitutional doctrine over
time—often indirectly. However, work remains to explore popular
constitutional argument as a matter of explicit constitutional practice
and to determine whether (and when) it may be an appropriate source
of authority in the courts.
Finally, still another strand does describe the Supreme Court’s
use of public opinion as an explicit part of its decisionmaking
process.17 For instance, Corinna Barrett Lain’s pioneering work
explores the areas in which the Supreme Court has explicitly taken
public opinion into account in constitutional doctrine through the use
of state legislation counts—in other words, through “evolving
standards” defined by the state laws on the books.18 However, no
scholar has yet attempted to disaggregate the various forms of popular
constitutional argument and show how they function—often in
tandem—as part of constitutional practice. State legislation counting
is an important form of popular constitutional argument; however, it
is only one form among many available to the popular constitutional
interpreter.
In this Article, I seek to take up both the descriptive and
normative challenges of developing an account of (what I call) popular
constitutional argument. Briefly stated, popular constitutional
argument is an argument that draws on the American people’s
considered judgments as a form of authority for reaching a given
constitutional conclusion. By “considered judgment,” I mean
something approaching a popular constitutional consensus—one that
unites the American people and is the product of deliberation and
debate.19 This type of constitutional argument takes many different
forms as a matter of constitutional practice, but the source of
authority—the considered judgments of the American people—
remains the same.

17. See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT (2008).
18. Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV.
365, 401 (2009).
19. For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the American people’s considered judgment on a
given issue as a “popular constitutional consensus.” However, I also take seriously Justin
Driver’s argument that constitutional historians often oversimplify constitutional consensus. See
Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755 (2011).
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Throughout, I take as my model Philip Bobbitt’s influential
account of conventional constitutional arguments.20 Building from
Bobbitt, I explore the use of popular constitutional argument in theory
and practice. While Primus is right that popular constitutional
argument remains controversial among many lawyers and scholars,21
I place these arguments in context and show how they have been used
in the courts as a form of constitutional reasoning akin to other
traditional sources of legal authority like text, history, structure,
doctrine, and prudence. I suggest that what may be missing as a
matter of constitutional theory and methodology is evident in
constitutional practice.
Of course, popular constitutional argument is in tension with
traditional conceptions of judicial review as a safeguard against
majoritarian tyranny.22 This is especially true in the case of minorityprotective provisions, such as the First Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause. In addition, recourse to “the People” is vague and
subject to abuse: it is another means by which judges can draw on
external sources of authority to promote their own notions of superior
policymaking and moral judgment.23 And yet, popular constitutional
consensus is sometimes a useful corrective for representative
deficiencies in the elected branches.24 As early as the Marshall Court,
in one of the first Supreme Court blockbusters, the Court itself rested
its decision on “settled . . . public opinion.”25
In this Article, I explore the challenges of applying popular
constitutionalism in the courts and then build a framework for
understanding and using popular constitutional argument in practice.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I attempt to bring some
coherence to the popular constitutionalism literature, explore the
various criticisms of the theory, and offer some tentative responses. In
Part II, I introduce popular constitutional argument and situate it
within the broader constitutional theory literature, including

20. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
21. Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 7.
22. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 690.
23. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1623 (“You can call a court ‘The People’s Court’
or a mob ‘The People’s Army,’ but fancy names cannot transform new government institutions
into the people themselves.”).
24. See Richard L. Hasen, Political Dysfunction and Constitutional Change, 61 DRAKE L.
REV. 989, 992–93 (2013) (discussing the realignment of political parties during the twentieth
century and resultant legislative difficulties in the early twenty-first century); Corinna Barrett
Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 148–52 (2012) (discussing functional and
political impediments to majoritarian change).
25. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 32 (1812).
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contemporary debates over judicial restraint, living constitutionalism,
popular sovereignty theory, and originalism.
In Part III, I explore popular constitutional argument in
practice, cataloguing the forms of popular constitutional argument—in
other words, the indicators of public opinion that have played a role in
recent constitutional practice at the Supreme Court. These indicators
include measures associated with the president, Congress, state and
local governments, the American people’s actions and traditions, and
public opinion polls. In Part IV, I consider how to craft popular
constitutional arguments, including some of the factors that make
strong (and weak) ones—most notably, patterns of constitutional
convergence (and divergence), related historical narratives, levels of
deliberation, and evidence of interbranch custom. I also explore the
relationship between popular constitutionalism and precedent.
Finally, in Part V, I end with a case study—the Supreme Court’s
recent landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges26—placing popular
constitutional argument in dialogue with Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion and Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent.
In the end, my goal is not to offer a comprehensive account of
every instance of popular constitutional argument at the Supreme
Court or to provide a full-throated defense of this form of argument as
the best way to interpret the Constitution. Instead, I seek to use
illustrative examples to show the various ways in which this form of
argument has operated at the Court and appealed to jurists from
across the ideological spectrum, warts and all.
I. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS
(AND THERE ARE MANY!)
Popular constitutionalism has spawned a sprawling literature
and a wide range of critics. Before building an account of popular
constitutional argument, it is useful to first map the various strands of
popular constitutionalism and then highlight key criticisms of the
larger theory.
Critics raise many legitimate objections to popular
constitutionalism—many of which inform the account of popular
constitutional argument that follows. Nevertheless, the theory can
survive this critical onslaught.

26. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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A. The Varieties of Popular Constitutionalism
Broadly speaking, it is possible to separate popular
constitutionalism into two branches: one descriptive and the other
normative. The descriptive literature explores the relationship
between the Supreme Court, the elected branches, social movements,
and public opinion.27 Many of these works build from Robert Dahl’s
keen insight decades ago that “the policy views dominant on the Court
are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among
the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”28
Some of this scholarship brings together political scientists and
legal scholars, examining the American people’s views on specific
constitutional issues and their support for different constitutional
methodologies.29 Other strands include works of constitutional history,
studying how the Constitution outside the courts (e.g., social
movements, elected officials, political parties, and the general public)
influences decisionmaking inside the courts, whether through
entrepreneurial lawyering, political threats, landmark statutes,
judicial appointments, court-curbing measures, or larger trends in
public opinion.30 Some of these historical narratives are sanguine,
highlighting how popular constitutional views filter into Supreme
Court decisionmaking.31 Others are pessimistic, arguing that the
twentieth century witnessed the triumph of judicial supremacy.32
While Larry Kramer looks to constitutional history to tell a
story of popular constitutional decline, much of this descriptive
literature seeks to establish that constitutional doctrine does not
27. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 16.
28. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).
29. See PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds.,
2008); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2598
(2003); Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True
Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 901 (2005); Jamal Greene et al., Profiling
Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 361 (2011).
30. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 16, at 1; FRIEDMAN, supra note 16; KRAMER, supra note 7;
ROSEN, supra note 16; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 16, at 1066–83; Joseph Blocher, Response,
Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys General, 122 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 108
(2011); Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 197 (2013);
Corinna Barrett Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1609 (2017); Jedediah Purdy,
Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837 (2009); Siegel, De Facto,
supra note 16, at 1345; Siegel, Dead, supra note 16, at 192. But see Lawrence Baum & Neal
Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515,
1516 (2010) (arguing that elite opinion matters more to the Justices than the views of the
American people as a whole).
31. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 16, at 2; FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 374–85; ROSEN,
supra note 16, at 4.
32. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 214–15, 249.
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impose elite judicial values on the rest of the country, but instead
tracks public opinion over time—especially on the constitutional
issues most important to the American people.33 In the end, this
descriptive work has done much to explain why doctrine often tracks
public opinion.
The normative literature—probably the most visible (and
certainly the most criticized) of the popular constitutionalism
scholarship—argues that the American people must have the ultimate
authority over constitutional meaning. These accounts are largely
characterized by attacks on the Supreme Court and judicial
supremacy.34 Normative popular constitutionalists fear that the
American people have lost their confidence as constitutional
interpreters and that the Supreme Court has seized power.35 In the
process, the American people have lost their capacity for selfgovernance and delegated constitutional decisionmaking to elite
lawyers.36 In response, this scholarship often explores possible
remedies, focusing on pathways of institutional reform.
The most radical theorists argue for an end to judicial review.37
Others promote blunt court-curbing measures like court packing and
jurisdiction stripping.38 In previous work, I have sought a middle
ground: an approach that respects the value of legal consensus, while
offering a popular check on bare majoritarian decisionmaking at the
Supreme Court—what I call “the People’s veto,” the popular

33. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 14 (“On issue after contentious issue—abortion,
affirmative action, gay rights, and the death penalty to name a few—the [modern] Supreme
Court has rendered decisions that meet with popular approval and find support in the latest
Gallup Poll.”); ROSEN, supra note 16, at 3 (“On a range of issues during the 1980s and 1990s, the
moderate majority on the Supreme Court represented the views of a majority of Americans more
accurately than the polarized party leadership in Congress.”).
34. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 247–48 (arguing the American people should “lay
claim to the Constitution” and “publicly repudiat[e] Justices who say that they, not we, possess
ultimate authority to say what the Constitution means”).
35. See, e.g., RICHARD D. PARKER, “HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE”: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST
MANIFESTO 71–73 (1994); Larry D. Kramer, Lecture, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison,
Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697,
697 (2006) (“Today, we have for all practical purposes turned the Constitution over to the
Supreme Court.”); Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 991, 991 (2006).
36. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 7–8 (“Law is set aside for a trained elite of judges
and lawyers whose professional task is to implement the formal decisions produced in and by
politics.”).
37. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 154.
38. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 249 (“Justices can be impeached, the Court’s budget
can be slashed, the President can ignore its mandates, Congress can strip it of jurisdiction or
shrink its size or pack it with new members or give it burdensome new responsibilities or revise
its procedures.”); Kramer, supra note 35, at 748 (discussing the use of such measures throughout
American history).
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reconsideration of constitutional decisions.39 (I haven’t found any
takers, either!) Given these blunt remedies, it is little wonder that
popular constitutionalism has faced widespread criticism.40
Finally, another set of scholars, sometimes styling themselves
“democratic constitutionalists,” has offered a friendly addendum to
popular constitutionalism. This scholarship—associated, most
prominently, with Robert Post and Reva Siegel—responds to specific
efforts by the Supreme Court to cut back on Congress’s authority
under the Reconstruction Amendments’ Enforcement Clauses.41
Rather than calling for court curbing or an end to judicial review, Post
and Siegel offer a defense of robust congressional enforcement
powers—a means of promoting constitutional dialogue between
Congress, the courts, and the American people.42
What—if anything—unites these various strands of popular
constitutionalism? As I have argued elsewhere, popular
constitutionalists are united by a “populist sensibility”—a shared
belief that popular constitutional consensus should shape
contemporary constitutional meaning.43 Even so, criticisms of popular
constitutionalism abound.

39. Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 159, 162.
For other efforts in a similar mold, see Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular
Constitutionalism in Trial Courts, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 971, 973 (2010) (proposing that
judicial review take place only at the trial court level); and Stephen Gardbaum, The New
Commonwealth Model, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 710 (2001) (evaluating the new commonwealth
model of constitutionalism). For a classic account of constitutional amendment outside of Article
V, see Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55
U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
40. For an incomplete list of Kramer’s critics, see Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1594;
Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 675; Neal Devins, The D’oh! of Popular Constitutionalism, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1341 (2019); William E. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth
Century: Reflections on the Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the
Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.KENT L. REV. 967, 968 (2006); Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiography of The People Themselves
and Popular Constitutionalism, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813, 813 (2006); Hulsebosch, supra note 3,
at 656; Robert Kaczorowski, Popular Constitutionalism Versus Justices in Plainclothes:
Reflections from History, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1415, 1438 (2005); L.A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People”
Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 857 (2005) (book review);
Lawrence G. Sager, Courting Disaster, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2005); and Suzanna
Sherry, Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 461, 463 (2009).
41. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7–8 (2003); Post & Siegel,
Departmentalism, supra note 11, at 1029; Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra
note 11, at 1945–47; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Roe Rage].
42. See Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 41, at 379.
43. Donnelly, supra note 39, at 161.
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B. Popular Constitutionalism’s Critics
Critics have attacked popular constitutionalism since its
inception on a variety of fronts. The theory’s first problem is
conceptual. Popular constitutionalists remain divided over many
fundamental issues. For instance, they disagree over what to do with
judicial review. Some wish to preserve it.44 Others wish to abolish it.45
And for scholars open to preserving judicial review (especially those
like Larry Kramer, who remain critical of judicial overreach46), the
question remains how best to reap the benefits of judicial review while
minimizing the dangers of judicial supremacy.
Popular constitutionalists also disagree on constitutional
history. Some argue that the countermajoritarian difficulty is no
difficulty at all and that the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions
tend to track public opinion.47 Others counter that the Supreme Court
has increased its power over time and that the American people and
their elected officials have acquiesced to judicial supremacy.48 These
competing narratives lead to radically different normative
prescriptions. Given these conceptual issues, one might even question
whether there is a distinct (and coherent) popular constitutionalism
literature at all.
Even if we grant that popular constitutionalism means
(constitutional) power to the people, this vision raises its own set of
problems, beginning with a simple (but difficult) one: Who are the
people, and how do we know if they have spoken?49 Some critics argue
that this challenge dooms popular constitutionalism from the start.50
For these critics, the American people do not exist as such, and
they certainly do not speak with a clear voice. As a result, any attempt
to divine the public’s views is simply too subjective an exercise.51 How
should we define public opinion for purposes of constitutional
decisionmaking? Should we look to public opinion polls, the positions
of the leading political parties, the results of recent elections, the
44. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 253 (concluding that retaining judicial review but
abolishing judicial supremacy would strike the correct balance).
45. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 154–76; Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1348 (2006).
46. KRAMER, supra note 7, at 247–48.
47. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 374–76.
48. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 7.
49. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 112.
50. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1621 (“From the founding era to today, the
people have been too numerous and diverse to speak with a single voice.”).
51. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127
YALE L.J. 664, 691 (2017) (book review).
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activities of social movements, mechanisms of direct democracy, or
laws at the federal, state, and local levels? And what level of public
consensus does popular constitutionalism require on an issue?52 A
mere majority? A supermajority? Near unanimity? There is no set
answer to these questions.
And even if we do settle these preliminary issues, there is still
the question of measurement and implementation. For popular
constitutionalism to work, we must have institutions capable of
channeling the American people’s constitutional views.53 However, all
institutions are flawed. Each raises its own principal-agent
problems.54 For instance, elected officials may act without a genuine
popular mandate55 by following a narrow agenda that serves only a
small (but powerful) faction56 or acting to aggrandize their own power
at the expense of the public interest.57 Furthermore, with no single
institution perfectly reflecting public opinion at the national level,
political actors—whether elected officials, movement leaders, or
interest groups—will each claim to speak for the American people.58
During times of ordinary politics, these concerns may be fairly
innocuous and ultimately settled by some combination of public
discourse, elections, and court cases. However, in their most extreme
form, these concerns—which date at least as far back as Carl
Schmitt59—provide a means for populist leaders to claim the authority
to speak for the “real” people of the nation,60 apart from (and in the
face of) empirical or institutional expressions of the public’s will to the

52. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1777–82 (2011).
53. Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1621; see Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 691
(discussing the inadequacy of such channeling).
54. Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1622–23 (“Once popular will is given institutional
form, we simply have another group of officials, thus giving rise to the same agency problems
that motivate the call for popular constitutionalism.”).
55. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2004) (noting that “public officials have no mandate, accountability, or
democratic mechanism for expression of public ‘constitutional’ will”).
56. See id. (“Legislatures are heavily influenced by vested, special interests . . . .”)
57. Cf. Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1637 (arguing that the judiciary serves as a
mechanism of “popular enforcement of the Constitution against blatant usurpations of authority”
by political actors); Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1015.
58. See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 690 (explaining that “absent univocal sovereign
action,” public actors will “appeal[ ] to the original and continuing constitutional authority of the
people”).
59. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 27 (2016); Christoph Möllers, “We Are
(Afraid of) the People”: Constituent Power in German Constitutionalism, in THE PARADOX OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 87, 104 (Martin Loughlin
& Neil Walker eds., 2007) (noting Carl Schmitt’s contributions to popular constitutionalism).
60. See MÜLLER, supra note 59, at 101.
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contrary.61 This is the danger of popular sovereignty without proper
institutional mechanisms.62 Unfortunately, all institutions suffer a
similar flaw. They are not the people—just imperfect reflections of
them. But criticisms of popular constitutionalism do not stop there.
Even if we bracket these institutional concerns, and even if we
measure and implement the public’s current views correctly, it is still
fair to ask whether the public’s views are even worth following. For
many critics of popular constitutionalism, this is the central flaw of
the theory—not the institutions, but the people themselves.63
This critique turns on some combination of perceived public
apathy and ignorance. Surveys show that the American people know
(and care) little about the Constitution’s text and history, the Supreme
Court itself, or the issues on the Supreme Court’s agenda.64 With little
interest and little knowledge, the American people may provide judges
and elected officials with few—if any—popular constitutional
understandings to implement. Moreover, these low levels of interest
and knowledge leave any remaining popular constitutional views
suspect. Critics fear that these views may be the product of elite
manipulation, not deliberation and debate.65 They question whether
the American people have the analytical skills, ability to weigh
competing claims, and capacity for long-term thinking necessary to
form proper constitutional conclusions.66
And even when individuals do reach considered judgments on
an issue, there is still no guarantee that the American public as a
whole will reach anything like a consensus.67 Our society is deeply
divided on many issues—many of them constitutional ones of great
salience. When the public lacks a consensus, there is simply no
popular view for institutions to translate into public action.68

61. See id. at 102 (explaining that populists are “immune to empirical refutation” because
they often try to “play off the ‘real people’ or ‘silent majority’ against elected representatives and
the official outcome of a vote”).
62. See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 690 (“Lacking the imprimatur of any procedure
by which the people can be said to have acted in its sovereign capacity, appeals to the
constitutional demands of a multitude are always susceptible to charges of opportunism and selfserving interpretation.”).
63. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 241–42 (describing the “Anti-Populist” critique of
popular constitutionalism).
64. Devins, supra note 40, at 1340; Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1222;
Michael Serota, Popular Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1635, 1656–59 (2012).
65. See Gewirtzman, supra note 29, at 899 (“Moreover, popular interpretive opinions are
often based on limited information, and are highly susceptible to manipulation by elites.”).
66. Serota, supra note 64, at 1659.
67. Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 3.
68. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1623 (discussing the low likelihood that the
public could come to a consensus on even a simple constitutional question).
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Furthermore, even when the public does reach a consensus, it may be
difficult to determine whether they’ve reached a constitutional
consensus rather than one based on policy or morality.69 Finally, even
if the American people have reached a constitutional consensus and
public officials can implement it, there is still the greatest danger of
all: the threat of majoritarian tyranny.
This concern turns on widespread fear of the repressive
tendencies of the American people themselves.70 For these critics, the
Constitution is designed to restrict the majority’s will, limit
governmental power, and protect individual rights.71 Judicial review
serves these purposes by enforcing constitutional limits;72 popular
constitutionalism risks subverting them.73 These critics leverage the
judiciary’s (perceived) institutional advantages—whether that’s the
judiciary’s political insulation74 or capacity for principled reasoning.75
These critics also agree that the Constitution’s meaning should not
fluctuate with public opinion76—or, even worse, bend to the public’s
will during times of emergency. For these critics, popular
constitutionalism threatens constitutionalism itself.
Of course, popular constitutionalists like Larry Kramer tell
happy stories of powerful presidents and the American people
standing together to check an evil (or ignorant) Supreme Court. But
the American people (and their elected leaders) sometimes err.77
Sometimes the people themselves (and their elected leaders)—and not
the Supreme Court—promote constitutional evil, with the Supreme
Court playing a mere supporting role (think, for example, of the
collapse of Reconstruction).78 While the courts are far from perfect,
they offer an additional check when the American people go astray.79
69. Id.; Devins, supra note 40, at 1341.
70. See Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1025 (arguing that civil liberties and rights “should
not depend on the wishes of the majority”).
71. See Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1219.
72. Scott D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution, and the History of Ideas, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1067, 1071 (2008) (arguing that “judicial review, robustly practiced, is an indispensable
mechanism for protecting the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution”).
73. See Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1013 (“Popular constitutionalism would mean that
courts would be far less available to protect fundamental rights.”).
74. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 3 (2001) (“What
distinguishes the justices from the people’s other representatives is their life tenure and their
consequent disinterestedness, not their legal acumen.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1019
(advancing the view that while the judiciary is not completely apolitical, “judicial review is not
the product of lobbying or direct pressure from special interests”).
75. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 32, 71 (1985).
76. Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 7.
77. Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1221.
78. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 930 (1996) (“The abandonment of Reconstruction, and certain of the ‘national security’
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Even if the threat of majoritarian tyranny is overstated,
popular constitutionalism might still undermine constitutional law’s
settlement function.80 Constitutional issues often divide the American
people. Judicial review provides a mechanism for settling some of
these issues and providing some stability and predictability in the
law.81 Critics fear that popular constitutionalism may lead to
divergent constitutional conclusions within different governmental
institutions, leading to conflicts—between the nation and the states,
and between institutions within each level of government—that
undermine the rule of law and sow discord throughout American
society.82
Finally, returning to popular constitutional argument inside
the courts, it is worth asking whether the courts can even play a
constructive role in translating popular constitutional meaning into
constitutional doctrine. Nothing in a judge’s training suggests that she
will have any expertise in divining public opinion.83 Even worse,
popular constitutional argument may give judges a new warrant to
read their own views into those of the American people, thus providing
a new avenue for judicial adventurism.84
Critics have attacked popular constitutionalism on many
fronts. Before building an account of popular constitutional argument,
it is important to first offer a (tentative) response to these critics.

excesses of the Cold War era, may be examples of profound and long-lasting changes in popular
sentiment that judges should have rejected.”).
79. See Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1021 (arguing that court interventions have been
necessary to end to racial, religious, and political persecution that resulted from “ ‘popular
constitutionalism,’ but hardly the kind that any of us wants to preserve or promote”). But see
Sanford Levinson, Popular Sovereignty and the United States Constitution: Tensions in the
Ackermanian Program, 123 YALE L.J. 2644, 2648 (2014) (noting that courts are powerless to
provide this check for duly adopted constitutional amendments, even those that would violate
the American “constitutional identity”).
80. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1629 (“The ‘rule of law’ provides very great
goods, including predictability, certainty, and stability.”).
81. See id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1014 (noting the “stabilizing effect of binding
decisions by the judicial branch”); Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 3, 15 (“Part of
the aspiration of the rule of law is government by stable, impersonal norms that do not vary with
passing fads or with the popularity of particular litigants.”).
82. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1635 (arguing that with popular
constitutionalism, “[t]he boundaries [of federal power] are unlikely to be crisp,” and Congress is
unlikely to take effective direction from vague standards such as “necessary and proper”);
Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1015 (expressing concern over the possibility that popular
constitutionalism “weaken[s] constitutional limits on the actions of elected and unelected” and
may create “discordant constitutional interpretations across the branches of the federal
government and the states”).
83. Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 3, 13.
84. Id. at 13.
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C. The Value of Popular Constitutionalism
The popular constitutionalism literature includes various
strands. Even so, the theory’s key proponents coalesce around three
reasons for valuing popular—as opposed to judicial—meaning.
First, American constitutional history is dominated by an
ongoing debate over rights and the proper scope of government.
Disagreement is pervasive and unavoidable.85 It is not the product of
duplicity, ignorance, a failure of legal reasoning, or simple prejudice.86
The Constitution simply raises difficult questions.87 For constitutional
theorists, the key question is who should be called on to resolve these
disputes. Popular constitutionalists agree that the American people
should play an important role in this process.88
Second, the judiciary does not have a monopoly on
constitutional wisdom. This rationale often turns on a critique of the
Supreme Court’s institutional setting and its role in history. For
instance, some popular constitutionalists argue that the Supreme
Court’s institutional advantages are often overstated.89 The Justices
rarely deliberate together about their cases.90 Oral arguments and
weekly conferences are short.91 The Justices often read little more
than the parties’ briefs and bench memoranda written by their
clerks.92 And the Justices’ clerks often write the first draft of the
Court’s opinions.93 As Kramer concludes, “This does not mean that the
Justices are not in control, but there is a considerable gap between
this kind of control and the stories told to justify judicial supremacy.”94
Popular constitutionalists also look to American history and
conclude that the Supreme Court has often fallen short of its
defenders’ expectations.95 These scholars look to decisions like Dred
Scott v. Sandford,96 Plessy v. Ferguson,97 and Korematsu v. United

85. Waldron, supra note 45, at 1368.
86. KRAMER, supra note 7, at 236.
87. Id.; see also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 231 (1999) (explaining that
constitutional rights issues raise “complicated” questions about which even the “best intellects of
our society” do not agree).
88. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 247–48.
89. Id. at 240.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 153.
96. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
97. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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States98 and ask whether the courts have actually tried to protect
minority rights and individual liberties over time.99 Others track
Gerald Rosenberg’s argument—an argument reinforced by recent
quantitative scholarship100—that even when courts act, they often fail
to significantly alter the status quo in the absence of political will or a
strong constitutional culture.101 In the end, popular constitutionalists
of many stripes believe that the case for judicial supremacy is
overstated.
Third, the American people and their constitutional
understandings
have
often
transformed
doctrine.
Popular
constitutionalists look to our constitutional tradition and argue that it
teaches a simple, but profound, lesson: constitutional doctrine remains
open to transformation. As Jack Balkin explains, “Opinions and views
that were once ‘off-the-wall’ later become orthodox, and the settled
assumptions of one era become the canonical examples of bad
interpretation in another.”102 Claims that were frivolous in the 1940s
or even the 1990s—for example, that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects marriage equality—are now enshrined in constitutional
doctrine. These transformations often turn on something other than
mere legal expertise.
Over time, new constitutional rights take on increased
prominence. Old principles are applied in new ways. Societal
developments force us to confront new evils—or to confront old ones
through a new constitutional lens. Legal reasoning alone is often
insufficient to address these societal shifts. Responding to societal
changes, public debates, and shifts in public opinion, the American
people (and their leaders) often drive constitutional change. In the
process, popular constitutional actors often expand the “constitutional
imagination” by offering new ways of reading the Constitution that
challenge constitutional orthodoxy.103 Following a period of
deliberation and debate, the Supreme Court often translates these
new popular readings into official constitutional doctrine. These new
readings may require a threshold level of constitutional knowledge or
commitment; however, they often turn on something other than the

98. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
99. See Waldron, supra note 45, at 1377.
100. Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Courts’ Limited Ability to Protect Constitutional
Rights, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 293, 297, 309 (2018).
101. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 5–6 (1991).
102. BALKIN, supra note 16, at 1.
103. Martin Loughlin, The Constitutional Imagination, 78 MOD. L. REV. 1, 3, 12–13 (2015).
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constitutional niceties tested in surveys about the public’s
knowledge.104
In the end, even if popular constitutionalists unite around
these three insights, scholars have still focused little on questions of
methodology.105
For a popular constitutionalist like Mark Tushnet, the
methodological answer is easy. The Supreme Court does not do much
to promote liberty and equality.106 We have no reason to think that it
will be any better at promoting these values than the elected
branches.107 So, let’s just abolish judicial review and focus on enforcing
the (thin) Constitution through the elected branches. However, for
those who wish to preserve a role for judges in constitutional disputes,
the question remains: How does a popular constitutionalist approach
constitutional interpretation?
One response might be to simply let the system continue to
operate as it has been operating for centuries, and the invisible hand
of public opinion will continue to guide official constitutional doctrine.
Some popular constitutionalists (for example, Barry Friedman) might
argue that this is the lesson of history.108 However, popular
constitutionalists owe judges more guidance than that. While I
provided some clues about these methodological issues elsewhere,109
the challenge remains: what does popular constitutional argument
look like both in theory and in practice? I offer a more complete
response in the remainder of this Article.
My goal is to outline an approach to popular constitutional
argument that is responsive to traditional constitutional theory,
consistent with well-established constitutional practice, and resonant
with popular constitutionalism’s various strands—even the anti-court
account of the theory’s most famous proponent, Larry Kramer.
Kramer’s work is both descriptive and normative. It is history with
104. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 11 (arguing that the American people can—and do—
enforce a “thin Constitution,” which includes the Constitution’s “fundamental guarantees of
equality, freedom of expression, and liberty”).
105. See Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1214 (explaining that even with these
insights, “the need to answer the normative question about the sources of judicial authority
remains”); Sherry, supra note 40, at 463 (“It is hard to know how popular constitutionalism
would work, since few (if any) of its advocates make any concrete suggestions about how to
implement popular constitutional interpretation.”).
106. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 129–53.
107. See id. at 154–76.
108. For additional scholarship establishing a link between public opinion and constitutional
doctrine, see generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); and Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
109. Donnelly, supra note 8.
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considerable normative bite. While Kramer attacks the rise of judicial
supremacy, he does not reject judicial review. His goal is to promote
deliberative democracy—a system that checks “the fleeting
passions . . . of the moment,” refines public debate, and enforces the
American people’s considered views about the Constitution.110 The
question remains as to how that system might work—especially inside
the courts.
II. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
In his classic book, Constitutional Fate, Philip Bobbitt draws on
the “legal grammar that we all share” to derive a set of legitimate
arguments from constitutional theory and practice.111 Bobbitt explains
that “the Court hears arguments, reads arguments, and ultimately
must write arguments, all within certain conventions.”112 However,
these conventions are far from settled.113 New constitutional
arguments emerge, and others recede.114 Some become more powerful,
and others become less persuasive. Building from Bobbitt, I explore
the use of popular constitutional argument in theory and practice.
In this Part, I introduce what I mean by popular constitutional
argument and situate it within ongoing debates in constitutional
theory, including contemporary debates over judicial restraint, living
constitutionalism, popular sovereignty theory, and originalism. I turn
to constitutional practice in Part III.
A. Popular Constitutional Argument: The Basics
Popular constitutional argument draws on the American
people’s views as a form of authority for reaching a given
constitutional conclusion. However, the popular constitutional
interpreter does not settle for vague claims of popular authority or a
single public opinion poll asking a constitutional question. Instead,
she looks to a series of concrete indicators of public opinion to guide
her analysis.
To craft a persuasive popular constitutional argument, the
interpreter must seek out the American people’s considered
judgments—not through the bare assertions of a single elected official
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Kramer, supra note 35, at 730.
BOBBITT, supra note 20, at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 175.
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or the results of the most recent Gallup poll, but through a set of
indicators showing evidence that the American people have reached
something approaching a popular consensus on a given issue.115 These
indicators might take a variety of forms, including measures
associated with the president, Congress, state and local governments,
the American people’s actions and traditions, and public opinion polls.
The interpreter might also consider factors such as patterns of
constitutional convergence (or divergence), related historical
narratives, levels of deliberation, and evidence of interbranch custom.
Despite the distinct contours of each specific popular constitutional
argument, the source of authority remains the same—the considered
judgments of the American people.
To make popular constitutional argument work, the interpreter
will likely need any or all of the following: a textual hook (e.g., the
Equal Protection Clause), a doctrinal hook (e.g., a suspect class
meriting heightened scrutiny), and a shift in how the public views the
world (e.g., the LGBT community is like other groups protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment). The interpreter will then need to look to
indicators of public opinion to determine whether a new popular
constitutional consensus has emerged and, if so, how that might
transform constitutional doctrine (and reinforce—or challenge—the
interpreter’s own independent constitutional conclusions).
The interpreter might use popular constitutional consensus in
a variety of ways. First, she might use it to check the representative
branches when their laws and actions fail to reflect the public’s
views—perhaps due to some flaw in the system. Second, she might use
it to reinforce her own independent constitutional conclusions, check
some of her own constitutional pathologies, or argue that her
opponents are making the countermajoritarian difficulty worse. Third,
she might use it to evaluate existing constitutional doctrine—either as
a way of legitimating a well-established line of cases, as a way of
arguing that a particular case should be overturned, or as a way of
justifying an entirely new doctrinal framework for a given
constitutional issue. In fact, popular constitutional consensus may be
especially useful in justifying the persistence of a doctrinal approach
that is difficult to justify as an original matter but has long since
become settled (and accepted) law (e.g., the Miranda rule).116

115. By developing a robust account of popular constitutional argument, I am heeding
Justice Goldberg’s warning not to leave “judges . . . at large” to decide fundamental rights “in
light of their personal and private notions.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
116. See infra notes 264–266 and accompanying text.
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Of course, popular constitutionalism’s critics may be right. The
American people may know very little about most constitutional
provisions, issues, and cases.117 And even when the American people
reach considered judgments at the individual level, high-profile
constitutional issues often divide the public.118 When the American
people either hold no view or remain divided, then the interpreter
must turn to other constitutional arguments—whether that is another
constitutional modality or even a simple commitment to judicial
restraint as the next best way of realizing popular judgments.
Furthermore, even if a public consensus emerges, many other
questions remain.119 Which indicators of public opinion should the
interpreter privilege? What threshold of popular support should the
interpreter require before enforcing popular constitutional
conclusions? Should the interpreter limit popular constitutional
argument to certain provisions—for instance, open-ended provisions
(possibly) tied to unenumerated rights, such as the Ninth Amendment
or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause?
Should she exclude minority-protective provisions like the First
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause? And what sorts of
popular
conclusions
should
count—explicitly
constitutional
conclusions or a broader range of public views, including policy
preferences and moral views that bear on the application of key
constitutional provisions? While I will not be able to resolve all of
these questions in this Article, I seek to provide a framework for
beginning to resolve them, both in theory and practice.
For now, I offer a few preliminary thoughts. To begin, certain
constitutional provisions and doctrinal tests may be more consistent
with popular constitutional argument than others. For instance, the
Constitution’s text includes broadly worded provisions that raise
questions that could theoretically turn on popular judgments,
including whether a law is “necessary and proper” (Article I, Section
8), a “search or seizure” is “unreasonable” (Fourth Amendment),
government compensation for seized property is “just” (Fifth
Amendment), a trial is “speedy” (Sixth Amendment), bail or a
government fine is “excessive” (Eighth Amendment), a punishment is
“cruel and unusual” (Eighth Amendment), an unenumerated right is
fundamental (e.g., the Ninth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment), or a Bill of Rights provision should be incorporated

117. Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1625; Serota, supra note 64, at 1656–59.
118. See Hasen, supra note 24, at 992–93 (discussing party realignment in the wake of the
Civil Rights Movement and its relationship with increasingly polarized political parties).
119. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 705.
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against the states (e.g., Fourteenth Amendment). Similarly, certain
doctrinal tests might offer a tighter theoretical link to the public’s
views—most notably, whether a law or governmental practice serves a
sufficiently “compelling interest” to survive heightened scrutiny.
In addition, it is possible to distinguish between at least three
different modes of popular constitutional opinion. First, the public
might hold direct constitutional views (e.g., a particular practice or
law is unconstitutional, or a specific constitutional provision means X).
Second, the public might hold a certain policy view or reach a certain
moral judgment that might play a role in constitutional reasoning
(e.g., nearly every state protects an individual’s right to own a gun, or
recent opinion polls show that a strong majority believes that
discriminating against the LGBT community is wrong). Third, and
finally, the public might recognize certain facts on the ground that
might inform a constitutional issue (e.g., separate schools are
inherently unequal, or corporate expenditures corrupt the political
process).
These different modes of popular constitutional opinion may
serve different interpretive purposes. Public opinion might supply an
explicit constitutional judgment. This might include a direct gloss on
the Constitution’s text (e.g., whether a certain type of search or
seizure is “unreasonable”), a direct conclusion about a practice’s
constitutionality (e.g., bans on assault weapons are unconstitutional),
or a preference for a specific case’s outcome (e.g., the baker should win
in a case involving a same-sex couple requesting a wedding cake120).
Alternatively, it might include a policy judgment (e.g., public support
for bans on gender discrimination in employment) or public
recognition of new facts on the ground (e.g., racial diversity is
important to public education), either of which might be relevant to a
shift in constitutional doctrine. Of course, some interpreters might
determine that these final examples are too attenuated to justify a
particular constitutional conclusion. But others may disagree and use
them as an important source of popular constitutional authority.
For those interested in making popular constitutional
argument work, a final—and powerful—objection arises. Can courts
even do this? Of course, judges are not trained to discern public
opinion. However, by limiting popular constitutional argument to
instances of genuine consensus, even interpreters with limited
training in analyzing public opinion might be able to recognize the
American people’s considered judgments.121 Furthermore, even if
120. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
121. Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1222.
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public opinion is arguably more remote from a judge’s legal training
than another approach, such as constitutional history, judges already
do draw on indicators of public opinion to aid in their constitutional
decisionmaking. In this Article, I seek to use these existing patterns of
constitutional practice to build up a robust account of popular
constitutional argument.
B. Popular Constitutionalism and Constitutional Theory
Before turning to how popular constitutional argument has
worked in practice, I will first situate it within contemporary debates
in constitutional theory, including debates over judicial restraint,
living constitutionalism, popular sovereignty, and originalism.
1. Judicial Restraint:
The Elected Branches Are Not “the People”
Popular constitutional argument is not a simple appeal to
judicial restraint. Of course, one traditional argument is that the best
way to realize popular constitutional views is to simply defer to the
elected branches. This would give the American people, the political
process, and elected officials the authority and responsibility to debate
and settle constitutional issues.122 It is no wonder that some popular
constitutionalism scholarship defends judicial restraint as the primary
means of addressing constitutional issues.123
By embracing judicial restraint, popular constitutionalists
might unite with the work of early, influential constitutional theorists,
including James Bradley Thayer and Felix Frankfurter.124 However,
there are limits to judicial restraint as a primary approach to popular
constitutional argument. To understand these limits, we should first
return to Thayer’s canonical account and then consider the tradeoffs of
embracing
the
elected
branches
as agents
of
popular
constitutionalism.
In his classic article, Thayer looks to American constitutional
history to understand the origins of judicial review and how it has

122. See generally Brad Snyder, Frankfurter and Popular Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 343 (2013) (discussing the implications of the link between judicial restraint and popular
constitutionalism).
123. Id. at 347–50; see Brad Snyder, The Former Clerks Who Nearly Killed Judicial
Restraint, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2129, 2151–52 (2014) (arguing popular constitutionalism is
closely related to judicial restraint).
124. Snyder, supra note 123, at 2130, 2133 (discussing the work of James Bradley Thayer);
Snyder, supra note 122, at 345 (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s jurisprudence).
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been applied in practice by American courts.125 From his survey of
early American history, Thayer derives a rule that advances a strong
vision of judicial restraint.126 For Thayer, a court cannot simply
“disregard” an act “as a mere matter of course,—merely because it is
concluded that upon a just and true construction the law is
unconstitutional.”127 Instead it can only invalidate it when the state
legislature has “not merely made a mistake” but has “made a very
clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational question.”128
This rule is not a mere call for the courts to rubber-stamp
legislative acts but instead turns on the respect that is owed the
legislative branch, its constitutional role, and its professional
judgment.129 For Thayer, a court risks descending into “a pedantic and
academic treatment of the texts,” while the ideal state legislator
combines “a lawyer’s rigor with a statesman’s breadth of view.”130
Thayer fears that judicial review might weaken this valuable
perspective.
For Thayer, judicial review has “a tendency to drive out
questions of justice and right” from legislatures and to fill legislators’
“mind[s] . . . with thoughts of mere legality, of what the [C]onstitution
allows. And moreover, even in the matter of legality, they have felt
little responsibility; if we are wrong, they say, the courts will correct
it.”131 (Later theorists—most notably, Mark Tushnet—take up this
critique under the label of “judicial overhang.”)132 Thayer’s solution is
to redeem the legislators’ constitutional responsibility through a
commitment to judicial restraint—one that leaves many constitutional
decisions in the legislators’ (and the electorate’s) hands.133
For those concerned with the countermajoritarian difficulty,
judicial restraint is a reasonable, if blunt, response. Thayer’s approach
also limits the dangers of judicial adventurism. However, for the
popular constitutional interpreter, it may also defer too much to the
conclusions of the elected branches.
While judicial review may sometimes serve as a check on the
elected branches, it may also be used as a tool to promote popular

125. See Thayer, supra note 9, at 129 (discussing the inferential power of judicial review
granted to judges by state constitutions prior to the enactment of the Federal Constitution).
126. Id. at 143–44.
127. Id. at 144.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 136.
130. Id. at 138.
131. Id. at 155–56.
132. TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 57–58.
133. Thayer, supra note 9, at 156.
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sovereignty134 by acting as a corrective for the various democratic
deficiencies of the elected branches.135
Of course, one of the pervasive features of our constitutional
system is its various veto points. To many—including the Framers—
this is not a bug in our system but one of its most important features.
Federalism divides power between the national government and the
states. Separation of powers distributes power to three independent
branches, each with distinct constituencies and terms of office. And
the system of checks and balances provides each of these sources of
political authority with the tools to check the other branches.
However, these tools also restrict majoritarian political action.136
Modern political trends and practices exacerbate some of these
countermajoritarian tendencies.
Our parties are as polarized as ever. Congressional moderates
are disappearing,137 making compromise more difficult.138 Wellestablished institutions like the congressional committee system and
the Senate filibuster (and its increased use) provide further obstacles
to majoritarian action.139 And scholars lament other factors that may
insulate incumbents and loosen our elected branches’ representative
ties to the American people, including partisan gerrymandering,
closed primaries, high-dollar political contributions (and spending),
and special-interest lobbying.140
Because of these countermajoritarian factors, the elected
branches often struggle to pass legislation that matches the
majoritarian preferences of the electorate.141 At the same time, public
opinion often outpaces legislation, and legislatures struggle to repeal
old, unrepresentative laws.142 As a result, old laws may survive for a
range of reasons, including enduring support, a crowded legislative
agenda, widespread indifference, or ongoing political paralysis.143
More broadly, critics see a political system dominated by legislative

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 192, 289.
Hasen, supra note 24, at 992–93.
Lain, supra note 24, at 115–16.
See Hasen, supra note 24, at 992–93.
NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE
DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2d ed. 2016); Hasen, supra note 24, at 993.
139. Hasen, supra note 24, at 993, 1010; Lain, supra note 24, at 148.
140. See Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1015; Hasen, supra note 24, at 1009; Lain, supra
note 24, at 115–16, 148–52. Scholars still debate the power of these forces, but they remain a
concern of many.
141. Devins, supra note 40, at 1338; Lain, supra note 24, at 157.
142. Lain, supra note 18, at 403–04; see Lain, supra note 24, at 173 (“Legislation is not
always the most reliable evidence of contemporary values. Sometimes it is not reliable at all.”).
143. See Lain, supra note 18, at 404.
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gridlock and partisan pandering—with elected officials often catering
to extremist base voters to avoid party primaries, not looking to
promote the public good or the views of a majority of their constituents
(or even their own best independent judgment on a given issue).144
With a system overrun by these problems, judicial review
might offer a partial remedy. If political inaction merely reflects a
divided public with no consensus on an issue, then this is not a
problem for popular constitutionalism. There is simply no popular
action for the elected branches to take. However, in other instances,
popular constitutional argument provides a way of using judicial
review to correct some of the deficiencies of the representative
branches.
Recent scholarship suggests that unelected judges often do an
effective job promoting majoritarian preferences through judicial
review.145 As Corinna Barrett Lain explains, “Supreme Court decision
making is relatively fluid; the Court can change the status quo
whenever a majority of the Justices decide to do so.”146 This may lead
the Supreme Court to strike down a law passed by a previous majority
(as with the Defense of Marriage Act in United States v. Windsor)—
one supported by a large enough number of elected officials to block
legislative repeal, but also opposed by a majority of the American
people.147 It may also lead the Court to strike down outlier laws in the
states.148
Even so, some influential popular constitutionalists—most
prominently, Mark Tushnet—may still want to abolish judicial review
and leave constitutional questions to the elected branches.149 For these
scholars, judicial review is simply not worth the trouble and it would
be better to take the Constitution away from the courts. However,
even important Supreme Court skeptics like Larry Kramer preserve a
role for the courts within a system of popular constitutionalism. These
scholars are less interested in checking the Court than in realizing the
American people’s considered judgments. From this perspective,
simple judicial restraint may not be enough.

144. Lain, supra note 24, at 152.
145. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 14–15 (noting that Supreme Court decisions often
converge with public opinion); Lain, supra note 24, at 117 (arguing that unelected, majoritarian
courts may check the elected, nonmajoritarian branches through judicial review).
146. Lain, supra note 24, at 157.
147. See 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
148. See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 246, 247 (2008).
149. TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 154.
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For these scholars, when the elected branches fail and a
popular constitutional consensus exists, the Court may step in to
enforce popular constitutional views—especially if the perceived
deficiencies of the elected branches outweigh legitimate concerns
about the judiciary’s competence in discerning public opinion. While
this move may not completely resolve Thayer’s and Tushnet’s concerns
about judicial overhang, judicial review remains one way of realizing
the constitutional views of the American people.
2. Living Constitutionalism:
Popular Constitutional Argument Is More than a Feeling
Living constitutionalism and popular constitutionalism bear a
resemblance to one another across many dimensions. Both theories
believe that constitutional doctrine should remain in line with
contemporary values. Both may call on judges to play a role in
translating these values into constitutional doctrine. And both
approaches are undertheorized; indeed, critics attack them as vague
and incoherent. At the same time, these two projects are distinct in
important ways. To understand how and why, we must first construct
a coherent account of living constitutionalism—a synthesis that is
lacking in the existing literature.
Living constitutionalists are methodologically pluralist, often
drawing on the full set of traditional constitutional arguments: text,
history, structure, doctrine, prudence, and ethos.150 When interpreting
the Constitution, many living constitutionalists are also candid about
drawing on their own sense of fairness and good social policy.151
Finally, while methodologically eclectic, these theorists tend to share a
common goal—to promote a vision of the Constitution that
“keep[s] . . . in touch with contemporary values,”152 “adapts to
changing times,”153 and “update[s] and [re]affirm[s]” the Constitution’s
text in a normatively attractive way for each generation.154
150. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 143–
51 (1996); William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 437 (1986); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living
Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 358 (2007).
151. See Brennan, supra note 150, at 437 (acknowledging the “substantive value choices”
made by the Founders and the need to for every generation to update them to fit new values);
Leib, supra note 150, at 361 (arguing that living constitutionalists take into account “discussions
of consequences” and “underlying principles of political morality” when interpreting the
Constitution).
152. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 569 (2006).
153. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 277 (2011).
154. Leib, supra note 150, at 359.
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For critics, living constitutionalism’s methodological eclecticism
fails to provide judges with concrete guidance on how to decide
individual cases. Instead, living constitutionalist judges can simply
read their own values into the Constitution.155 This is a powerful
critique—but its overall strength depends on the specifics of the
interpreter’s approach to living constitutionalism. The existing
literature suggests two ways of “keeping” constitutional doctrine “in
touch with contemporary values.” Both have roots in Justice
Brennan’s canonical defense of the theory.
The first approach is the most familiar one: living
constitutionalism as independent judicial decisionmaking. Channeling
Robert Jackson, Justice Brennan connects this approach with the
traditional view that “the very purpose of our Constitution—and
particularly of the Bill of Rights”—was “to declare certain values
transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities.”156
In other words, the independent judge should apply the Constitution’s
text in ways consistent with her own (elite) values—often to protect
minorities from majoritarian abuses. In this account, her
constitutional authority is tied to her duty as a judge, her professional
training as a lawyer, and a vision of elite lawyers as defenders of our
most cherished constitutional values.157 These living constitutionalist
interpretations will often contradict the constitutional views of the
community. This approach is not consistent with popular
constitutional argument.
Justice Brennan offers the powerful (and controversial)
example of his conclusion that the death penalty is unconstitutional,
an approach, he concedes, “to which a majority of my fellow Justices—
not to mention, it would seem, a majority of my fellow countrymen—
does not subscribe.”158 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan embraces the
role of judge as living constitutionalist prophet:
[W]hen a Justice perceives an interpretation of the text to have departed so far from its
essential meaning, that Justice is bound, by a larger constitutional duty to the
community, to expose the departure and point toward a different path. On this issue,

155. See BALKIN, supra note 153, at 277–78; J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELFGOVERNANCE 11 (2012); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 693, 693 (1976). See also Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1737, 1755 (2007) (arguing that living constitutionalists “sometimes use more abstract
texts . . . as a springboard for elitist efforts to revolutionize American values”).
156. Brennan, supra note 150, at 436.
157. See WALDRON, supra note 87, at 244 (“Instead of empowering the people on the grounds
that it is . . . their rights that are at stake, we might instead entrust final authority to a scholarly
or judicial elite, on the ground that they are more likely to get the matter right.”).
158. Brennan, supra note 150, at 444.
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the death penalty, I hope to embody a community, although perhaps [one that has] not
yet arrived, striving for human dignity for all.159

Justice Brennan’s approach is a familiar form of living
constitutionalism and one with many supporters in the legal academy,
political branches, and general public.
The second approach—living constitutionalism as community
values—looks to construe the Constitution’s text in ways that are
consistent with the evolving values that actually exist among the
American people. This approach is meant to respond to the dead-hand
problem.160
Returning to Justice Brennan, even he concedes that “[t]he
Constitution cannot be for me simply a contemplative haven for
private moral reflection.”161 Instead, as a Justice, he must “speak” for
his “community” and not for himself “alone.”162 As a result, “[t]he act
of interpretation must be undertaken with full consciousness that it is,
in a very real sense, the community’s interpretation that is sought”—
not the mere “personal moral predilections” of the interpreter.163 This
approach to living constitutionalism is consistent with popular
constitutional argument—even if Justice Brennan himself does not
offer any details for how a judge might go about discerning the
“community’s interpretation.” Sympathetic living constitutionalists
might draw on popular constitutional argument to fill this interpretive
gap.164
In the end, David Strauss offers today’s most sophisticated
account of living constitutionalism—one that incorporates both
strands of the theory. Strauss’s approach builds from constitutional
practice and seeks to constrain judges through a form of common-law
constitutional reasoning.165
For Strauss, the Constitution’s text constrains at times, but
constitutional practice is dominated by judges wrestling with
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 195–98 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988)
(introducing the “dead hand” problem).
161. Brennan, supra note 150, at 433.
162. Id. at 434.
163. Id. at 434–35.
164. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 307 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing
the Constitution as “a living Constitution” and arguing that a conviction under Texas’s “threestrikes” law should have been thrown out based on his own sense of the community’s judgment—
namely, that “[t]he sentence imposed upon the petitioner would be viewed as grossly unjust by
virtually every layman and lawyer”).
165. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) [hereinafter STRAUSS, LIVING
CONSTITUTION]; Strauss, supra note 78; David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001) [hereinafter Strauss, Irrelevance].
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doctrine.166 While critics may charge that this leaves judges in an
“anything goes” world and the law as “nothing more than a reflection
of judges’ political views,” Strauss counters that judges are
constrained by their own professional training and their own
perceptions of their institutional role.167 For Strauss, judges draw on
traditional legal tools to make decisions in constitutional cases—tools
like judicial precedent, legal craft, and sound judgment.168 And while
judges cannot help but be shaped by their society’s evolving values,
judges need not simply yield to public opinion—especially when
threats of majoritarian tyranny loom.169
Over time, judges must simply read cases, employ analogical
reasoning, and develop constitutional doctrine in a case-by-case,
common-law manner. At the same time, Strauss is candid that when
traditional legal resources run out—or when a result is sufficiently out
of step with one’s normative commitments—the judge will “often” base
her ruling on “her views about which decision will be more fair or is
more in keeping with good social policy.”170 This approach is consistent
with the common-law tradition, but inconsistent with popular
constitutional argument.171
Even
with
Strauss’s
nuanced
account
of
living
constitutionalism, familiar dangers remain. Strauss offers little
concrete guidance to the judge in the individual case—other than an
appeal to her own professional training, independent judgment, and
sense of judicial humility. His theory is one of sensibility, not
methodology. He also provides little specific guidance for when a judge
may overturn precedent. Instead, those questions turn on some
combination of judicial caution, professional norms, and moral
judgments. Strauss’s defense may accurately describe constitutional
practice, but popular constitutionalists may want additional guidance
for judges.
In the end, popular constitutional argument offers the
possibility
of
a
principled,
constrained
form
of
living
constitutionalism—one that limits judicial discretion by forcing judges
to analyze concrete indicators of public opinion.172 For the popular
constitutional judge, it simply will not do to rely on generic appeals to

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Strauss, supra note 78, at 891.
See id. at 879, 927–28, 931–32.
Id. at 931.
See id. at 930–31.
STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 165, at 38.
See Strauss, supra note 78, at 900.
See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 696–97.
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the “evolving” constitutional views of the American people or on one’s
own conclusions about sound policy or political morality.
When the American people have spoken, the popular
constitutional judge must listen. Sometimes she might discover a
popular constitutional consensus that reinforces her own
conclusions—with popular constitutional argument countering
charges of judicial adventurism and strengthening the judge’s claim to
speak for the community. However, other times she might be
compelled to follow the American people’s constitutional voice—even if
she does not like what she hears. Either way, popular constitutional
argument does not rely on a judge’s own independent judgment about
policy or morality. However, it is up to popular constitutional theory to
identify the methodological tools required to make popular
constitutional argument work.
3. The Ackermanian Challenge: Taking Popular Sovereignty
Originalism Seriously
Like the popular constitutionalist, Bruce Ackerman argues
that the American people must play a key role in constitutional
change. As a leading theorist of popular sovereignty, Ackerman
provides
extensive
theoretical
guidance
to
the
popular
constitutionalist seeking to identify when the American people have
spoken on key constitutional issues. However, Ackerman’s approach is
distinct in many ways. Most importantly, it limits popular sovereignty
to certain important periods of higher lawmaking—leaving judges and
lawyers to protect each revolutionary generation’s achievements and
work out their meaning over time. The popular constitutionalist seeks
to offer a more flexible approach—one that shares Ackerman’s central
goal and borrows from many of his core insights but also allows
interpreters to identify popular constitutional consensus outside of
what Ackerman has famously labeled “constitutional moments.”
Ackerman’s theory offers a unique mix of constitutional
dynamism and legal formalism.173 Through a “reflective study of the
past,” Ackerman looks to American constitutional history to identify
patterns of legitimate constitutional lawmaking.174 His goal is to build
an account of how the Constitution changes outside of the context of
Article V. Through this study of history, Ackerman seeks a formal rule

173. See Ackerman, supra note 155, at 1754.
174. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 17.
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of recognition—one that allows him to distinguish between genuine
acts of popular sovereignty and the mere acts of ordinary politics.175
As Ackerman teaches, the pathways of constitutional change
are not identical. Different historical “cases”—e.g., the Founding,
Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Civil Rights Revolution—
privilege different institutional arrangements, different agents of
change, and different legal materials.176 However, within these
variations, Ackerman identifies certain key similarities—the key
components of his “constitutional moments.”177
In each case, a new constitutional proposal must run a
multiyear institutional gauntlet, characterized by national debates,
high-profile political battles, important elections, and contentious
Supreme Court fights.178 Constitutional reformers must persuade an
engaged public, win a series of institutional battles, attract support (or
force acquiescence) from their political opponents, and convince the
Supreme Court to translate their constitutional victories into durable
constitutional doctrine.179 This is how Ackerman identifies when the
American people have spoken.180 It is a powerful account, albeit one
that has been attacked on multiple fronts.181 Regardless, it remains a
helpful model for popular constitutional argument: part guidebook,
part cautionary tale.
While Ackerman has never provided a full account of how a
committed Ackermanian might interpret the Constitution, he has
provided glimpses in various works. In the remainder of this Section, I
attempt to construct an approach to Ackermanian interpretation and
then set it in dialogue with popular constitutional argument.
For Ackerman, the American people are the key agents of
constitutional change, and judges are bound by the American people’s

175. Id. at 59.
176. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 542 (2014); 1
ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 58–80.
177. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 58–80.
178. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 43–47; 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 3–31; 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 266–94 (1997).
179. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 42.
180. Id. at 51.
181. See, e.g., Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 697–98 (complaining that Ackerman’s
theory is too difficult to apply); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11
CONST. COMMENT. 115 (1994) (arguing that Reconstruction’s collapse must be read as a
“constitutional moment”); David A. Strauss, The Neo-Hamiltonian Temptation, 123 YALE L.J.
2676 (2014) (arguing that Ackerman’s account doesn’t match what the constitutional reformers
thought they were doing at the time); cf. GERARD MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE
CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES (2007) (exploring the
constitutional importance of the Jacksonian Age).
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considered judgments during periods of higher lawmaking.182 To
decide a constitutional issue, the Ackermanian interpreter must draw
on past patterns of higher lawmaking to identify when the American
people have spoken.183 This is the most fully developed part of
Ackerman’s theory. Interpreters must engage in the delicate task of
distinguishing between acts of ordinary politics and acts of higher
lawmaking—in other words, genuine acts of popular sovereignty.184 In
the former, elected officials are permitted to act within the boundaries
set by the written Constitution and by the principles laid down during
those rare moments when “We the People” have spoken.185 In the
latter, the American people can rewrite the constitutional rules—but
only if constitutional reformers gain the “broad” and “sustained”
support of the American people and traverse Ackerman’s pathway of
constitutional change.186 In other words, the reform proposal must
qualify as a bona fide “constitutional moment.” Importantly, for the
interpreter, any principles endorsed during these constitutional
moments have just as much legal force as an Article V amendment,
shaping the outcome of new constitutional cases and entrenching
these new principles against political reversals (absent another act of
popular sovereignty that meets Ackerman’s test).187
From there, the Ackermanian interpreter must look to
synthesize the constitutional principles endorsed by the American
people over time—incorporating new principles and refining (or, in
some cases, discarding) old ones.188 Ackerman offers few details about
how this process of “intergenerational synthesis” might work,189 but
his account does capture a core aspect of American constitutional
practice: the tendency to read new constitutional revolutions against
the enduring commitments of our past and to try to “fit” any new
principles into a “larger pattern of constitutional development.”190
As part of this process, judges both preserve and synthesize.
They guard old principles from reversal by ordinary politicians and
182. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 139.
183. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 337; 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 58–80, 266–94; 2
ACKERMAN, supra note 178, at 3–31.
184. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 230–94.
185. Id. at 230–65.
186. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 224; 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 266–94; 2
ACKERMAN, supra note 178, at 3–31.
187. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 33, 225, 317.
188. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 336; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 178, at 207–54
(analyzing the Reconstruction regime’s principles against those established by the Founding
generation).
189. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 144.
190. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 1, 336.
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give new principles concrete legal content through the creation of
durable constitutional doctrine.191 This happens through a common
law process, with judges facing “concrete cases” that force them “to
confront and reconcile . . . the disparate historical achievements of the
American people.”192 Of course, there is no mechanical way to carry
out this process. Instead, Ackerman leaves it to judges and lawyers—
whether through professional legal judgment, statesmanship, or some
combination thereof—to synthesize these principles one case at a time,
applying the constitutional principles of the past to today’s
constitutional controversies.
Unlike the popular constitutional interpreter, the Ackermanian
judge is not tasked with seeking out contemporary public opinion for
guidance. Current opinion is the product of normal politics, and the
Ackermanian has no guarantee that it reflects the considered
judgment of the American people—a judgment shaped by heightened
engagement, broad debate, political contestation, and extended
deliberation. Better to ignore contemporary public opinion and await
the next constitutional moment (or lead it). Popular constitutional
interpreters are more open to identifying popular consensus outside of
Ackerman’s constitutional moments, recognizing the call of the
American people on an ongoing basis.193 This approach allows the
popular constitutional interpreter to respond to one of the strongest
objections to Ackerman’s theory—that it fails to offer a satisfying
account of many key constitutional transformations that occur in
between Ackerman’s constitutional moments.
Of course, popular constitutional argument is not without risk.
Like Ackerman, popular constitutional theorists must design their
own safeguards against constitutional false positives—instances when
public opinion may reflect the half-baked views of an inattentive
public or when elected officials may claim a false mandate for
constitutional reform. In short, the popular constitutional interpreter
increases the difficulty of identifying when the American people have
spoken—a challenge that Ackerman addresses through his demanding
rule of recognition.194
In the end, Ackerman already provides the interpreter with
some theoretical guidance. So far, popular constitutionalists have
failed to offer the same. In this Article, my goal is to fill this gap—both
addressing Ackerman’s legitimate concerns about the dangers of false

191.
192.
193.
194.

1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 139.
Id. at 160.
Strauss, supra note 78, at 905.
See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 278–80; Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 697–98.

Donnelly_PAGE2_Donnelly (Do Not Delete)

108

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1/7/2020 7:19 AM

[Vol. 73:1:73

positives and providing the interpreter with more flexible interpretive
tools than Ackerman’s multistage process—tools that allow the
interpreter to identify periods of constitutional change outside of
Ackerman’s constitutional moments.
4. Originalism: Is Popular Constitutional Argument a Rule of
Constitutional Construction?
Originalists take a range of interpretive approaches, and many
(if not most) originalists would reject popular constitutional argument
outright.195 However, one of originalism’s key insights may help
situate popular constitutional argument within the wider universe of
constitutional theory.
Originalists are bound by the Constitution’s original
meaning.196 As Keith Whittington explains, “At its most basic,
originalism argues that the discoverable . . . meaning of the
Constitution at the time of its . . . adoption should be regarded as
authoritative for purposes of later constitutional interpretation.”197 To
understand the interpreter’s task, many originalists divide
constitutional analysis into two separate phases: interpretation and
construction.198
Interpretation uses traditional legal materials to determine the
original meaning of the Constitution’s text.199 However, there are
limits to what the interpreter can determine through “relatively
technical and traditional instruments, such as text and structure,
framers’ intent, and precedent.”200 Once the interpreter reaches these
limits, the task of construction remains. Construction “fills the
inevitable gaps created by the vagueness” of the Constitution’s text
“when applied to particular circumstances.”201 As Whittington
explains, “[A]dditional meaning . . . must be constructed from the
political melding of the document with external interests and
195. For an overview of the originalism literature, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism
Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); and Keith E. Whittington,
Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013).
196. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 144 (1990); Whittington, supra note 195, at 379.
197. Whittington, supra note 195, at 377.
198. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 153; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Lawrence B. Solum,
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). Originalists also
distinguish between “vagueness” and “ambiguity.” Solum, supra, at 97–98.
199. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 100–01 (2004).
200. WHITTINGTON, supra note 198, at 1.
201. BARNETT, supra note 199, at 102.
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principles,”202 with “[c]onstructions perform[ing] important work by
filling in gaps of constitutional meaning.”203
The Constitution’s text speaks clearly in some places—often
with narrow, easy-to-apply rules.204 For instance, a twenty-five-yearold cannot be president. However, the Constitution also includes broad
language—principles like “equal protection,” “due process of law,”
“privileges or immunities,” and “freedom of speech.”205 Of course, these
“abstract, general, and vague” pieces of constitutional text are
precisely the provisions on which most of the Supreme Court’s highprofile cases turn.206 When a term is irreducibly vague or ambiguous—
in other words, when traditional legal materials fail to resolve a
particular constitutional issue—interpretation ends and construction
begins. The question remains: Which institution should we entrust
with this task?
Some originalists argue that when interpretation ends, so too
should the judicial task itself.207 In short, judges should simply defer
to the elected branches and allow them to engage in constitutional
construction.208 This is a reasonable conclusion—and one that is
consistent with an account of judicial decisionmaking closely linked to
a judge’s legal expertise. When traditional legal materials run out,
there is simply nothing more for the judge to do. Construction becomes
a political task for the elected branches. However, some originalists
disagree, reserving an important role for judges in the task of
constitutional construction.209
For these scholars, within the “construction zone,” judges
might choose to apply a rule of constitutional construction that is
guided by a particular normative principle—whether tied to the
American constitutional tradition, a freestanding theory, or some
combination of the two.210 For instance, Randy Barnett argues that
202. WHITTINGTON, supra note 198, at 1.
203. Whittington, supra note 195, at 403.
204. See BALKIN, supra note 153, at 6.
205. See id. (‘The text of our Constitution contains different kinds of language. It contains
determinate rules . . . . It contains standards . . . . And it contains principles.”).
206. See Solum, supra note 198, at 108.
207. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 157.
208. Whittington, supra note 195, at 404; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 158.
209. Whittington, supra note 195, at 401. Of course, originalists also disagree about how
many issues interpretation resolves—and, conversely, about the size of the construction zone. Id.
at 404. This question is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I focus on what the popular
constitutional interpreter should do inside the construction zone—no matter its size. Even so,
debates over the construction zone’s size remain important to popular constitutional theory. If
the construction zone is large, popular constitutional argument may touch a great number of
issues. If it is small, then it will not.
210. See Solum, supra note 198, at 108.
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when interpretation runs out, judges should apply a “presumption of
liberty.”211 Following Barnett, popular constitutional argument might
be understood as a rule of constitutional construction, applied by
judges when the Constitution’s original meaning runs out.212
Like many originalists, popular constitutionalists fear judicial
adventurism, seeking to root judges’ interpretations in concrete
indicators—not personal normative preferences.213 There is no reason
why a popular constitutional interpreter could not combine a version
of originalism with popular constitutional argument. For instance,
when the Constitution’s original meaning is clear, the popular
constitutional interpreter might apply it in much the same way as an
originalist. However, when the traditional legal materials run out—
when the Constitution’s text is vague or irreducibly ambiguous and
the American people have reached a considered judgment on the
issue—the popular constitutionalist might apply popular consensus as
a default rule.214
But how might the interpreter actually go about that task? In
other words, how might she identify when the American people have
spoken? We turn to that important question in Part III.
III. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL
PRACTICE: THE FORMS OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
To make popular constitutional argument work, scholars must
provide interpreters with the methodological tools necessary to
identify when the American people have reached a considered
judgment about the Constitution’s meaning.
In this Part, I take up that task, exploring a variety of public
opinion indicators available to interpreters. These indicators are the
component pieces of popular constitutional argument. Sometimes one
of these indicators will stand alone. More often, they will work
together, allowing the interpreter to explore whether the American
people have reached a popular consensus about a given constitutional
issue. As with any other form of constitutional argument, popular
constitutional argument is unlikely to settle our most vexing
constitutional issues. However, it may be a useful tool to help us reach
a satisfying conclusion in a given case.
211. BARNETT, supra note 199, at 253–73.
212. Popular constitutional argument only conflicts directly with originalism if an
interpreter argues that contemporary values should supersede the Constitution’s original
meaning. But this result need not follow from popular constitutionalism’s core.
213. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 140.
214. See Solum, supra note 198, at 104–05; Whittington, supra note 195, at 404.
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This catalogue is not intended to be exhaustive. Instead, I build
on previous scholarship to create a typology of public opinion
indicators—a typology that can be refined and supplemented in future
work. My goal is to draw on constitutional practice and previous
scholarship to bring coherence to popular constitutional analysis. Only
then will we be in a better position to determine whether popular
constitutional argument is a viable and attractive approach to
constitutional interpretation. Admittedly, some modes of analysis are
more common than others. However, interpreters can use all of these
indicators to form powerful constitutional arguments rooted in
popular consensus.
A. State and Local Laws, Actions, and Activities
The most familiar form of popular constitutional argument
draws on state and local laws, actions, and activities.215 This form of
argument is already well established as a matter of constitutional
practice, and scholars have already explored certain features of it in
detail. Nevertheless, it is worth disaggregating its component parts to
better understand its various forms. While many scholars have
focused on state legislation counting as one source of popular
constitutional authority, the interpreter might look to a variety of
other indicators tied to states and localities, including state
constitutions, state and local government amicus participation,
patterns of law enforcement, ballot measures, and the everyday
practices of the American people and their governments. I consider
each of these indicators in turn.
State Legislation. The most familiar form of state and local
constitutional argument is state legislation counting. In her
pioneering scholarship, Corinna Barrett Lain has already shown the
pervasiveness of this practice.216 Her scholarship highlights that
judges look to the state laws on the books to address not just familiar
areas like the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process, but
also a range of others, including procedural due process, equal
protection, religious liberty, free speech, searches and seizures, and
takings.217
State legislation counting touches on many of the interpretive
areas in which popular constitutional argument is most useful. For
215. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 97 (2012).
216. Lain, supra note 18.
217. Id. at 367–68, 371–405.
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instance, Justices often use state legislation counts to strike down
outdated laws or governmental practices. This is a familiar move, so a
brief example should suffice. Consider the Court’s long-standing
approach to the Eighth Amendment. In this context, the Court looks to
state legislation to help apply the Constitution’s ban on “cruel and
unusual punishment.”218 To that end, the Court often considers both
the state laws on the books and any trends in legislative activity.219
Lain’s scholarship shows that the Justices apply similar reasoning in
other constitutional contexts.220
At the same time, the Justices often use state legislation counts
to defend the constitutionality of such laws and practices—drawing on
the popular constitutional authority of state legislation to argue that a
particular law or practice is consistent with a national consensus. On
the Roberts Court, Justices from across the ideological spectrum have
relied on this form of popular constitutional argument.
Consider Chief Justice Roberts and the campaign-finance
context. Chief Justice Roberts turned to state legislation counting in
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar when applying strict scrutiny to a
Florida regulation preventing judicial candidates from personally
soliciting campaign funds.221 The Chief Justice looked to the rules in
other states and concluded that “[l]ike Florida, most other States
prohibit judicial candidates from soliciting campaign funds
personally . . . [with] 30 of the 39 States that elect trial or appellate
judges . . . adopt[ing] [similar] restrictions.”222 Chief Justice Roberts
used these state judgments to reach an important conclusion about
the relationship between direct judicial fundraising and perceptions of
corruption: “Simply put, Florida and most other States have concluded
that the public may lack confidence in a judge’s ability to administer
justice without fear or favor if he comes to office by asking for
favors.”223 As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the Florida
regulation survived strict scrutiny—with the Florida rule “advanc[ing]

218. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 714–19 (2014)
(analyzing how states had adopted IQ cutoffs in death penalty cases when determining if
Florida’s strict cutoff was unconstitutional); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307, 312–17 (2002)
(determining if imposing the death penalty on a person with a severe mental disability was
unconstitutional and considering state legislation).
219. Lain, supra note 18, at 373; see, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (using a state legislation
count as part of a constitutional ruling striking down state laws imposing the death penalty on
those with severe mental disabilities); id. at 322–24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (expressing
support for state legislation counting).
220. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 18, at 367–68, 371–405.
221. 575 U.S. 433, 437–41, 445, 454 (2015).
222. Id. at 440.
223. Id. at 445.
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the State’s compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary.”224
Similar examples in the campaign-finance context abound—
often in dissent. For instance, both conservative and progressive
Justices have used similar arguments in the context of corporate
campaign expenditures.225 In Citizens United v. FEC, Justice Stevens
drew on state legislation counts in his dissent, observing that “half the
state legislatures . . . over many decades” have concluded that “their
core functions of administering elections and passing legislation
cannot operate effectively without some narrow restrictions on
corporate electioneering paid for by general treasury funds.”226
Similarly, nearly four decades earlier (and also in dissent),
then-Justice Rehnquist turned to state legislation counts in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. In Bellotti, Rehnquist drew, in
part, on state legislative judgments about both the value and the
constitutionality of restrictions on corporate campaign spending to
support the constitutionality of a Massachusetts law regulating
corporate political activity, observing that the “legislatures of 30 other
States . . . have considered [this] matter, and have concluded that
[such]
restrictions . . . are
both
politically
desirable
and
constitutionally permissible. The judgment of such a broad consensus
of governmental bodies expressed over a period of many decades is
entitled to considerable deference.”227
Returning to the Roberts Court and moving beyond campaign
finance, Justice Alito has looked to state legislation in a variety of
contexts. Consider his concurrence in Riley v. California.228 There, the
Court held that police officers must generally secure a warrant before
searching digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual
who has been arrested.229 Justice Alito agreed with the Court’s
judgment, but he wrote separately to address a few points, one of
which drew a connection between state legislation and how best to
apply the Fourth Amendment in the digital age.230

224. Id. at 444.
225. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 284 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (evaluating
Vermont contribution limits, comparing those limits to those passed by other states, and arguing
that Vermont’s limits should be upheld because they were “not remarkable departures” from
those of other states).
226. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 421 n.46 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 823 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
228. 573 U.S. 373, 404–08 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
229. Id. at 403 (majority opinion).
230. Id. at 404–08 (Alito, J., concurring).
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While Justice Alito saw no alternative to the majority’s
approach in Riley, he urged the Court to continue to look to the states
for alternative rules. For Justice Alito, state legislation might serve as
a useful source of information for judges—one rooted in the
legislature’s substantive expertise and its ties to the public’s views. As
he explained, “I would reconsider the question presented here
if . . . state legislatures, after assessing the legitimate needs of law
enforcement and the privacy interests of cell phone owners, enact
legislation that draws reasonable distinctions based on categories of
information or perhaps other variables.”231 On this view, state
legislation may help the Justices determine what sort of police
behavior is “reasonable” in the context of the Fourth Amendment and
how to strike the right balance between security and digital privacy.232
Justice Alito has applied similar reasoning elsewhere, particularly in
the First Amendment context (and often in dissent).233
The Justices also use state legislation to both identify
unenumerated rights worthy of constitutional protection and
incorporate Bill of Rights provisions against the states. Some scholars
argue that the use of popular constitutional arguments in this context
is consistent with the Constitution’s text and history—most notably,
under the Ninth Amendment (for unenumerated rights) and the
Fourteenth
Amendment
(for
unenumerated
rights
and
incorporation).234 The Supreme Court has followed suit.235
231. Id. at 407–08.
232. Interestingly, Alito made a similar argument in United States v. Jones—another Fourth
Amendment and technology case. See 565 U.S. 400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”).
233. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 806 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring
in the judgment) (warning the Court not to “hastily dismiss the judgment of legislators, who may
be in a better position . . . to assess the implications of new technology”); Snyder v. Phelps, 562
U.S. 443, 463–75 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (looking at the state tort law landscape and
attacking the Court for rejecting a plaintiff’s tort claim for emotional harms associated with an
offensive protest at a military funeral); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 496 & n.6 (2010)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that state legislation against animal cruelty reflected a “national
consensus” and, in turn, this consensus provides “proof” that the “government interest” in
regulating animal cruelty videos was “compelling”).
These Alito opinions call to mind Chief Justice Rehnquist’s use of state legislation counting
to frame flag-burning as low value speech for purposes of First Amendment doctrine. See Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 435 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Surely one of the high
purposes of a democratic society is to legislate against conduct that is regarded as evil and
profoundly offensive to the majority of people—whether it be murder, embezzlement, pollution,
or flag burning.”).
234. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 52, at 1781–82 (“[I]n recognizing new rights, judges are not
amending the [Constitution]. Rather, they are applying it, construing directives in the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments that call for protection of fundamental but nonspecified rights.”).
235. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 777 (2010) (using a state legislation
count to support the move to incorporate the Second Amendment against the states); Lawrence
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In the end, state legislation remains a well established and
powerful source for the popular constitutional interpreter. However,
the Supreme Court looks to more than state legislation in this context.
State Constitutions. The popular constitutional interpreter may
study the rights enshrined in state constitutions. Because these
constitutions are easier to amend than the U.S. Constitution, they are
often a better proxy for contemporary public opinion than their federal
counterpart. Furthermore, many scholars have turned to the study of
state constitutions in recent years.236 The Supreme Court has
similarly heeded this call.237
For instance, in her dissent in Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia v. Comer, Justice Sotomayor argued that state funding for
religious institutions was unconstitutional.238 As part of her analysis,
she turned to state constitutional provisions covering this issue. After
explaining the long tradition of restricting funding for these
institutions, Justice Sotomayor observed that thirty-nine states
enshrined this tradition in their constitutions through provisions that,
“as a general matter, date back to or before these States’ original
Constitutions.”239 For Justice Sotomayor, these provisions reflected
“this Nation’s understanding of how best to foster religious liberty.”240
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (looking to patterns in state legislation to show “an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710,
723 (1997) (observing that “almost every State” makes it “a crime to assist a suicide” and
warning that recognizing a constitutional right to die would “strike down the considered policy
choice of almost every State”).
236. See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2006)
(analyzing state convention debates as a means of revising and rejecting governing principles as
adopted in the federal convention of 1787); SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012) (examining the structures of the U.S.
Constitution and the constitutions of the states and studying the connection between these
documents and the growing political dissent in the country); EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS
IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS
(Ira Katznelson et al. eds., 2013) (arguing that state constitutions contain positive rights that are
ignored by federal constitutional politics); Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual
Rights Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What
Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2008)
(providing an analysis of individual rights in state constitutions); Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E.
Agudo & Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights Are
Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (2012)
(continuing the analysis of individual rights in state constitutions).
237. For instance, the Supreme Court looked to the gun rights enshrined in state
constitutions when determining whether to incorporate the Second Amendment against the
states. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769.
238. 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2027–41 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 2037.
240. Id.
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State and Local Governments Inside the Courts. The popular
constitutional interpreter might also follow the Supreme Court in
looking to state and local governmental participation in constitutional
litigation.241 For instance, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the
Supreme Court noted an amicus brief “submitted by 38 states” as part
of its analysis of whether to incorporate the Second Amendment
against the states.242 Similarly, in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme
Court highlighted that “Florida and 12 other States” brought that
constitutional challenge against the Affordable Care Act and “were
subsequently joined by 13 [additional] States.”243
Patterns of State and Local Law Enforcement. The popular
constitutional interpreter might look to patterns of state and local law
enforcement. This form of analysis played a key role in the Supreme
Court’s decision striking down Texas’s antisodomy law in Lawrence v.
Texas.244
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy not only surveyed the
state laws on the books, but he also looked to state and local
enforcement of existing antisodomy laws. Justice Kennedy observed
that these laws were rarely enforced by state and local law
enforcement officials.245 He explained, “Laws prohibiting sodomy do
not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in
private,” making it “difficult to say that society approved of a rigorous
and systematic punishment of the consensual acts committed in
private and by adults.”246 In other words, Justice Kennedy enforced a
form of constitutional desuetude.247
State Ballot Measures. Each of the indicators above draws on
official government action—an indirect means of assessing popular
constitutional views. State and local ballot measures offer a more
direct means of assessing public opinion.

241. See Blocher, supra note 30, at 111–14 (discussing the important but often overlooked
role of state attorneys general in popular constitutionalism).
242. 561 U.S. at 789.
243. 567 U.S. 519, 540 (2012).
244. 539 U.S. 558, 569–70, 573 (2003).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 569–70.
247. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (noting that “even among those States
that regularly execute offenders . . . only five have executed offenders possessing a known IQ less
than 70” in recent years and concluding that, given these enforcement patterns, the practice had
“become truly unusual”).
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While most ballot measures address specific questions of public
policy, some states and localities have used advisory ballot measures
to assess the public’s views on constitutional issues—for instance, the
constitutionality of corporate campaign spending after Citizens
United.248 However, even policy-focused ballot measures may prove
useful in building popular constitutional arguments. And although not
a prevalent source at the Supreme Court, some Justices have relied on
state ballot measures as a gloss on whether a state law served a
compelling enough interest to survive constitutional review.249
The Everyday Practices of the American People and Their
Governments. Finally, the popular constitutional interpreter may look
to the everyday practices of the American people and their state and
local governments. This approach is consistent with Supreme Court
practice. When analyzing a constitutional issue, the Justices
sometimes look to how state and local governments operate, how the
American people live their lives, or some combination of governmental
and community practices.
In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court looked to
the pervasiveness of state legislative prayer when determining the
constitutionality of prayer at a town council meeting.250 The Supreme
Court upheld the practice, and, in his majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy drew on state and local governmental practice to support his
conclusion.251
As Justice Kennedy explained, the Establishment Clause
“must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and
understandings.’ ”252 The Court had already upheld state legislative
prayer decades earlier in the context of state legislatures, relying, in
part, on the fact that “the majority of the other States also had the

248. Vikram David Amar, Are “Advisory” Measures (Like Proposition 49) Permitted on the
California Ballot?, VERDICT (Aug. 29, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/08/29/advisorymeasures-like-proposition-49-permitted-california-ballot
[https://perma.cc/T5KT-R2XE]
(describing advisory ballot measures assessing constitutional support for Citizens United).
249. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 761–72
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (drawing conclusions about the public’s views about money in
politics and corruption from a state ballot measure); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S
377, 394 (2000) (“[A]lthough majority votes do not, as such, defeat First Amendment protections,
the statewide vote on Proposition A [a campaign-finance measure] certainly attested to the
perception relied upon here: ‘An overwhelming 74 percent of voters of Missouri determined that
contribution limits are necessary to combat corruption and the perception thereof.’ ” (quoting
Carver v. Nixon, 882 F. Supp. 901, 905 (S.D. Mo. 1995), rev’d, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), rev’d,
528 U.S. 377 (2000))).
250. 572 U.S. 565, 574–81 (2014).
251. See id.
252. Id. at 576 (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989)).
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same, consistent practice” for “more than a century.”253 After turning
to modern practice, Justice Kennedy observed that “dozens of state
legislatures” continued to use legislative prayer and local governments
often opened meetings with a prayer as well.254 As a result, Justice
Kennedy concluded, “[T]here can be no doubt that the practice . . . has
become part of the fabric of our society.”255
The Justices have also sought to incorporate the American
people’s everyday practices into constitutional doctrine.256 For
instance, the Supreme Court adapted First Amendment doctrine to
the evolving role that film played in the lives of the American people.
In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of a New York law permitting the
restriction of films on the grounds that they were “sacrilegious.”257 The
Court had previously upheld legislation creating an Ohio board of
censors that screened films before they were shown in public.258 In
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, the Court relied, in part,
on the role of film in early twentieth-century American society to
uphold the Ohio board, explaining that “the exhibition of moving
pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for
profit, like other spectacles.”259 As a result, the Supreme Court
concluded that films were “not to be regarded . . . as part of the press
of the country, or as organs of public opinion”—that is, media
protected by enduring free speech values.260
The Supreme Court decided Mutual Film before it incorporated
the First Amendment against the states. In Burstyn, the Supreme
Court addressed “whether motion pictures are within the ambit of
protection which the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth,
secures to any form of ‘speech’ or ‘the press.’ ”261 To answer that
question, the Court relied, in part, on film’s role within American
culture—a role that had shifted considerably since Mutual Film was
decided in 1915:
253. Id.
254. Id. at 570.
255. Id. at 576.
256. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 438 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (reviewing
the American flag’s role as “an important national asset” in everyday life).
257. 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952); see also Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine,
47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252–53 (1995) (describing the relationship between film’s role in
American culture and its treatment in First Amendment doctrine).
258. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 244–45 (1915) overruled in part by
Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495.
259. Id. at 244.
260. Id.
261. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501.
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It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the
communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of
ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political [and] social doctrine to the subtle
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion
pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed
to entertain as well as to inform.262

Given film’s important role in American society, the Court
concluded “that expression by means of motion pictures is included
within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.”263
Finally, the Supreme Court combined governmental and public
practices to form a powerful popular constitutional argument in
Dickerson v. United States.264 There, the Court was asked to
reconsider Miranda based on a law enacted by Congress two years
after that landmark decision, which was designed to restore the preMiranda legal framework.265 The majority opinion was authored by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was a longtime critic of Miranda. In a
powerful passage, he explored the relationship between precedent,
governmental practice, and popular culture:
Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture. While we have overruled our
precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, we
do not believe that this has happened to the Miranda decision. If anything, our
subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law
enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling that unwarned statements may
not be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief.266

Rehnquist’s reasoning in Dickerson remains one of the most powerful
statements of popular constitutional argument in the U.S. Reports.
Conclusion. Of course, as sources for popular constitutional
arguments, indicators covering state and local laws, actions, and
activities have their limits. For instance, take the most prominent
popular constitutional source in Supreme Court practice: state
legislation. This indicator only imperfectly reflects popular
constitutional views.267 The same may be said of others connected with
states and localities. Even so, state and local constitutional
arguments—state legislation counts, state constitutions, state and
local participation in litigation, law enforcement practices, ballot

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 502.
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
Id.
Id. at 443–44 (citations omitted).
For a review of some of these representative deficiencies, see supra Section II.B.1.
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measures, and the practices of the American people and their
governments—may serve as key components of a broader popular
constitutional argument.
B. The President
The president has a powerful claim to constitutional
authority.268 Upon taking office, he must take an oath to “preserve,
protect and defend” the U.S. Constitution, and he remains the one
public official who is elected to represent the entire country.269 It is
little wonder that presidents play a key role in Larry Kramer’s
pioneering popular constitutional narrative.270
To build a popular constitutional argument, the interpreter
may draw on the president’s actions and activities.271 To begin, she
may analyze the president’s attempts to advance a constitutional
vision through rhetoric on the campaign trail and while in office. For
instance, she may look to previous presidential elections, studying the
arguments made during the campaign and evaluating a president’s
claim to a popular mandate for a specific constitutional vision
following an election.272 She may also look to presidential speeches
once the president takes office, including key moments like inaugural
addresses and State of the Union speeches.273 While these types of
arguments are not evident in Supreme Court practice, they remain
available to the popular constitutional interpreter in future cases.
More concretely, the interpreter may examine the president’s
official actions and those taken by executive agencies and officials.
268. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 82 (2007)
(explaining that, historically, presidents have “claimed the authority to set the nation on a new
constitutional path, and in the process . . . rejected key aspects of the preexistent constitutional
tradition”).
269. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
270. Kramer, supra note 35, at 697–98.
271. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 69 (explaining that the public conversation
between presidential candidates Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater, which largely
concerned racial issues and the New Deal, suggests a living Constitution informed by public
mandates); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 16 (2010) (“In America’s republic of statutes, republican deliberation
over fundamental national commitment has migrated, relatively speaking, away from
Constitutionalism and toward legislative and administrative constitutionalism.”); Purdy, supra
note 30, at 1837–41 (arguing that, while other presidential actions inform some constitutional
theories, presidential statements and general speech largely impacts American
constitutionalism).
272. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 224 (“While the Court had been in the lead during
the first decade after Brown, it [became] the president and Congress who were claiming a
mandate from the people for a new commitment to the pursuit of racial justice.”).
273. See 3 id. at 7.
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These are the ways in which the president may exercise his power to
advance his constitutional vision while in office. The president may
work with Congress to pass landmark legislation that may reshape
core constitutional commitments, as with the Civil Rights Act of
1964.274 He may veto legislation (and author veto messages), issue
signing statements, and use executive orders to advance his vision.275
And executive officials and administrative agencies may issue
regulations to promote a president’s constitutional vision.276
In addition, the president’s lawyers may also make powerful
constitutional arguments—both inside and outside the courts. For
instance, the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) regularly answers
constitutional questions for the president, executive officials, and
government agencies.277 Although these OLC opinions vary in quality
and persuasiveness, they are often as detailed and rigorous as judicial
opinions, and the OLC’s lawyers are often drawn from the nation’s
best law firms and law schools.278
More importantly, the Solicitor General advances the
president’s constitutional vision inside the courts.279 The Solicitor
General’s office is highly respected within the judiciary and at the
Supreme Court.280 As a result, it often plays a key role in shaping the
Court’s docket at the certiorari stage by helping the Court identify
meritorious petitions among the thousands that it receives each
year.281 And at the merits stage, the Solicitor General offers skilled
274. See 3 id. at 95–104 (describing the integral role of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s public
statements and private acts in influencing Congress during deliberation over the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
275. Lain, supra note 30, at 1633.
276. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 171 (describing how the president can often ensure
that his legislation will create effective change with “the real-world experience generated by the
administrative process”); ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 271, at 10 (“The biggest change in
the Constitutional structure has been the creation of the modern administrative state, through
congressional delegations of lawmaking authority to independent agencies . . . .”).
277. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 95–110
(2010).
278. Id. at 98–99.
279. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 30, at 1631–33 (explaining that the Supreme Court grants a
large percentage of certiorari requests and rules in favor of the Solicitor General a majority of
the time); Snyder, supra note 122, at 383, 416 (describing Justice Frankfurter’s overtures to a
former law clerk within the Solicitor General’s office and probable deference to the Obama
administration’s refusal to defend the Defense of Marriage Act).
280. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 217 (1991) (“[W]hen the federal government seeks review, the chances of a case
being taken are quite high.”).
281. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1116 (1988) (“Previous research indicates
that cases are most likely to be selected for plenary review when . . . the solicitor general is the
petitioner.”).
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legal arguments that aid the Court in resolving difficult constitutional
issues.282 The Solicitor General’s office derives its authority from its
combined role as the voice of the executive branch in the courts and as
an important repeat player at the Supreme Court. The Department of
Justice and lawyers for various executive agencies serve a similar—if
less influential—role for their specific substantive areas in the courts.
Presidential constitutional arguments are not prevalent in
Supreme Court opinions. However, a recent Roberts Court decision,
NLRB v. Noel Canning,283 shows the power of this approach. There,
Noel Canning—a Pepsi distributor—asked the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit to set aside a National Labor Relations Board
order, arguing that the Board lacked a quorum because three of the
five Board members had been appointed in violation of the Recess
Appointments Clause.284 This was the first time the Supreme Court
was ever called on to interpret that Clause.
As part of his majority opinion, Justice Breyer drew heavily on
historical practice and the executive branch’s conclusions about the
scope of the Recess Appointments Clause. This included the
presidents’ consistent practice of issuing recess appointments during
intrasession recesses and official opinions written by the presidents’
legal advisors providing constitutional support for these decisions.285
In the process, Justice Breyer cited written opinions by the Attorney
General and the OLC, treating them much as he would Court
precedent.
For instance, take Justice Breyer’s analysis of the words
“vacancies that may happen” in the Recess Appointments Clause. He
concluded that this phrase encompassed both vacancies that had come
into being during a congressional recess and those that arose prior to a
recess.286 To reach this conclusion, he relied on the constitutional
judgments of presidents from the early republic through today—
including Presidents John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
and James Monroe.287 He also drew on the opinions of various
Attorneys General, including Edmund Randolph (arguing for a narrow
reading), William Wirt (arguing for a broader reading), and “[n]early
every subsequent Attorney General to consider the question

282. See Lain, supra note 30, at 1631–32 (describing the Solicitor General’s opinion as
particularly influential).
283. 573 U.S. 513 (2014).
284. Id. at 520.
285. See id. at 549.
286. Id. at 539.
287. Id. at 543–49.
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throughout the Nation’s history” (agreeing with Wirt in calling for a
broader reading).288
In the process, Justice Breyer also turned to Opinions of the
Attorney General and OLC opinions from 1832 through 2012.289
Finally, he observed that “every President since James Buchanan has
made recess appointments to pre-existing vacancies.”290 Justice Breyer
concluded, “Taken together, we think it is a fair inference that a large
proportion of the recess appointments in the history of the Nation
have filled pre-existing vacancies.”291 The Supreme Court then
construed the Clause to match this practice.
In the end, Canning was an unusual case. The Court was
called on to interpret the Recess Appointments Clause for the first
time—two hundred years after the ratification of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer’s opinion shows the promise and the
power of taking the president’s practices and constitutional arguments
seriously.
Interestingly, the Court also explicitly referenced a shift in the
President’s constitutional positions and reasoning in United States v.
Windsor.292 There, the Obama Administration refused to defend the
federal Defense of Marriage Act. In his majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy explicitly referenced this shift in position and the
Administration’s constitutional conclusions:
While [this case] was pending, the Attorney General . . . notified the Speaker of the
House . . . that the Department of Justice would no longer defend the constitutionality of
DOMA’s [section] 3. . . . [T]he Attorney General informed Congress that “the President
has concluded that given a number of factors, including a documented history of
discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to a
heightened standard of scrutiny.” . . . This case is unusual . . . because [this] letter was
not preceded by an adverse judgment. The letter instead reflected the Executive’s own
conclusion, relying on a definition still being debated and considered in the courts, that
heightened equal protection scrutiny should apply to laws that classify on the basis of
sexual orientation.”293

Scholars often highlight the importance of this shift by President
Obama and his lawyers in the constitutional battle over marriage
equality.294
288. Id. at 539–44.
289. Id. at 544.
290. Id. at 545.
291. Id. at 546.
292. 570 U.S. 744, 754.
293. Id. at 753–54 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
294. See Eyer, supra note 30, at 201 (“[T]here is a strong case to be made that the Obama
announcement helped to shape the ultimate outcomes (invalidation as unconstitutional) of the
many DOMA challenges that were decided in its aftermath, both in the lower courts and in
Windsor itself.”).
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Of course, presidential constitutional arguments are not
definitive. The president’s actions and activities often say very little
about the president’s constitutional—as opposed to political—vision.
Furthermore, even if the president’s actions do advance a
constitutional vision, that vision may reflect the views of a single
political party, not a popular constitutional consensus. And finally,
key executive branch lawyers may not fully represent the views of the
president.295 In the end, elected officials—whether the president,
Congress, or state or local officials—are not the people.296
These caveats aside, popular constitutional interpreters might
use presidential constitutional arguments in tandem with other
indicators of public opinion to build powerful popular constitutional
arguments.
C. Congress
To build a popular constitutional argument, the interpreter
may draw on Congress’s actions and activities.297 Possible
congressional indicators include individual pieces of legislation,
patterns of congressional policymaking, long-standing congressional
practice, congressional amicus participation, and electoral mandates. I
consider each, in turn.
Congressional Legislation. Beginning with congressional
legislation, the popular constitutional interpreter may look to
295. See Lain, supra note 30, at 1632 (“[T]he Solicitor General’s positions are not a perfect
proxy for those of the executive branch. In theory, the Solicitor General represents the United
States, not the President, and in practice the Solicitor General enjoys a substantial amount of
independence in determining what positions to take.”).
296. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 131 (“[T]he government is only imperfectly
representative of the people . . . .”).
297. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 8–9 (“[C]ertain landmark statutes are indeed
rooted in considered judgments of the people, and . . . it is these statutes, not formal
amendments, that provided the primary vehicle for the legal expression of popular sovereignty in
the twentieth century.”); ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 271, at 16 (arguing that because
Constitutional amendments can prove “costly and hard to revoke . . . a more lengthy and
polycentric statutory process has essentially superseded it”); Amar, supra note 52, at 1782; Lain,
supra note 30, at 1634 (“Congress communicates its constitutional views by passing legislation
that reflects a particular constitutional understanding . . . [C]ongressional legislation of this sort
serves a legitimating function, validating contested constitutional understandings by
transmitting them into the formal law.”); Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra
note 11, at 1985–86 (explaining that congressional action increasing civil rights protections
“demonstrates the institutionally differentiated ways in which Congress and the Court engage in
constitutional lawmaking”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the
People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2003) (arguing that
congressional dialogue with the judiciary and exercise of its Section Five power suggest
significant impact on constitutional culture).
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landmark statutes and determine their relationship to the
Constitution’s text, history, and structure.298 As part of this analysis,
she may examine the legislative history underlying a specific law—
particularly, speeches by congressional leaders and arguments
advanced in committee reports.299 She may also seek out larger
patterns in congressional lawmaking.
Congressional legislation may take on popular constitutional
importance in a variety of situations. First, congressional legislation
may provide a source of popular constitutional authority in the context
of Congress’s enforcement powers under various amendments—most
notably, the Reconstruction Amendments. While the Supreme Court
has asserted its own independent authority to set the boundaries of
Congress’s power under these provisions,300 the Court has long used
congressional legislation to shape its own constitutional
understanding in this context.301 Some scholars offer a powerful
defense of this relationship between the elected branches and
constitutional doctrine.
For instance, Akhil Amar argues that robust congressional
enforcement powers are consistent with the Reconstruction
Amendments’ text and history.302 And Robert Post and Reva Siegel
offer a powerful account of the relationship between Congress and the
Supreme Court in this context. For instance, they argue that when
Congress passes legislation under its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power, Congress exercises its own constitutional
“judgment[ ] about the [Constitution’s] meaning” and, in the process, it
“vindicate[s] public understandings about the nation’s needs and
obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment.”303 For them, this

298. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 199 (“Constitutional pragmatism was a key
contribution of the landmark statutes of the Second Reconstruction . . . .”); Post, supra note 41, at
40–41 (discussing President George W. Bush’s description of the recently passed ADA legislation
as an articulation of America’s democratic principles and notion of equality); Post & Siegel, supra
note 297, at 1–2, 14, 30–34 (discussing landmark statutes inspiring, and inspired by, landmark
cases).
299. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 150–51.
300. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (explaining that the federal
statute at issue, by controlling cases and controversies, is “beyond congressional authority” and
that the “Court’s precedent . . . must control”), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2012), as recognized in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
301. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (“The constitutional
propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the historical
experience which it reflects.”).
302. See Amar, supra note 52, at 1752.
303. Post & Siegel, supra note 297, at 2, 14.
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process places Congress on “virtually equal” constitutional “footing
with the Court.”304
The Justices sometimes draw on Congress’s interpretive
authority under its enforcement powers to uphold landmark statutes.
To justify deference, the Justices often appeal to high levels of
congressional debate and deliberation, Congress’s constitutional role,
and its democratic imprimatur. For instance, consider the Supreme
Court’s approach in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.305
In Katzenbach, the Supreme Court considered a constitutional
challenge to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”). In his majority
opinion upholding the VRA, Chief Justice Warren offered a powerful
defense of Congress’s constitutional conclusions, drawing on
Congress’s enforcement power,306 its meticulous study of voter
discrimination, and its overwhelming (and bipartisan) support for the
legislation. Chief Justice Warren highlighted the years of voter
discrimination by the states, the “great care” that Congress used in
studying the problem (including the extensiveness of the related
hearings), the “voluminous legislative history,” and the
“overwhelming” votes in favor of the legislation—a bipartisan coalition
with the “firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in
voting.”307
In the process, Chief Justice Warren discussed the length of
the hearings in the House and Senate and the extent of debate on the
floors of each House.308 He cited to the legislative record, including
House and Senate Committee Reports.309 Tracking Congress’s
constitutional judgment, the Supreme Court then upheld the VRA.310
Interestingly, nearly a half-century later, Justice Ginsburg used
similar arguments to defend the VRA in her Shelby County v. Holder
dissent—drawing on congressional indicators to lay bare the
countermajoritarian difficulty and attack the Court for subverting the

304. Post, supra note 41, at 41.
305. 383 U.S. at 308–15 (discussing the extensive legislative history and rationale for the
Voting Rights Act of 1965); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654–56 (1966) (offering
another powerful example of the Supreme Court reinforcing a robust congressional enforcement
power); Post & Siegel, supra note 297, at 34–36 (examining the deference that the Court
awarded to Congress and its interpretation of the Constitution in Katzenbach v. Morgan).
306. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324, 326 (arguing that the Reconstruction Framers made
Congress “chiefly responsible” for enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments).
307. Id. at 308–09, 315.
308. Id. at 308–09.
309. Id. at 309, 315.
310. Id. at 337.
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constitutional views of the American people and their elected
representatives.311
Second, the popular constitutional interpreter may look to
larger patterns in congressional lawmaking to discern newly
established constitutional principles.312 In these cases, the Court uses
congressional indicators to justify a new construction of constitutional
text or a shift in constitutional doctrine. This move does not turn on
simple deference to congressional legislation, as with Katzenbach and
Ginsburg’s Shelby County dissent, but instead uses congressional
legislation to interpret the Constitution anew, whether through
supporting a specific construction, recognizing a constitutionally
relevant fact, or shifting constitutional doctrine.313
A Supreme Court plurality took up this approach in Frontiero
v. Richardson.314 There, a married female air force officer and her
husband brought a challenge against the Secretary of Defense.315
Federal law made it more difficult for female officers to receive
spousal benefits than their male colleagues.316 The challengers argued
that the Court should recognize that “classifications based upon sex,
like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are
inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to
close . . . scrutiny.”317 In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan
agreed—drawing, in part, on congressional legislation to support his
argument that the Court should apply strict scrutiny to gender-based
discrimination.318
By the time Frontiero reached the Court, Congress had already
banned gender discrimination for nine years.319 As part of his analysis,
Justice Brennan studied the wave of legislation passed in the 1960s
and 1970s attacking general discrimination, including the Equal Pay
311. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 559–564, 593 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(telling a powerful story of sustained, “bipartisan” support for the VRA—relying on the
“overwhelming support” of Congress, Congress’s “conscientious[ ]” study of the problem, and the
Act’s reauthorization across various Congresses and Presidents).
312. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 150–51 (discussing the turn away from a restrictive
understanding of congressional constitutional power and toward a more inclusive interpretation,
including expansion of the equal protection and commerce powers).
313. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 11, at 1950–51; Post &
Siegel, supra note 297, at 32 (“The Court’s jurisprudence of sex discrimination illustrates how
the Court’s constitutional interpretations can draw strength and legitimacy from a dialogic
relationship to contemporary political culture.”).
314. 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973); see also Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra
note 11, at 2003–04 (noting the role of congressional constitutionalism in Frontiero).
315. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 677.
316. Id. at 679–80.
317. Id. at 682.
318. Id. at 688.
319. See Post & Siegel, supra note 297, at 32 & n.140.
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Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal
Rights Amendment.320 Justice Brennan observed, “[O]ver the past
decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to
sex-based classifications.”321 Given this legislation, Brennan reasoned,
“Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are
inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of
Government is not without significance to the question presently
under consideration.”322
Third, the popular constitutional interpreter may couple laws
on the books with Congress’s expertise and constitutional judgments
to justify judicial restraint in the face of a constitutional challenge.323
While the Frontiero plurality used congressional indicators to
heighten constitutional protections and attack a federal law, the Court
might also draw on congressional indicators to defend a law.324 At the
Supreme Court, this is a popular move in the campaign-finance
context.325 And many of these types of congressional constitutional
arguments parallel those that we witnessed in the context of
arguments drawing on state legislation—again, often, but not always,
in dissent.326
320. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 687–88. Chief Justice Rehnquist offered a similar analysis in Texas v. Johnson,
using a pattern of congressional lawmaking to establish a long-standing tradition of honoring
and protecting the flag in our nation’s law. 491 U.S. 397, 427–28 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
323. But see NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 555–56 (2012) (arguing that Congress’s failure
to regulate “inactivity” in the past cautions against upholding the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate).
324. Occasionally, the Supreme Court also draws on congressional expertise as expressed in
a single piece of legislation to construe a constitutional provision or apply well-established
doctrine. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (using Congress’s
definition of an intangible harm to apply the “injury-in-fact” requirement of Article III standing).
325. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 259 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (urging the
Court to look to the “evidentiary record” to “determine whether . . . [to] defer to Congress’ own
judgments, particularly those reflecting a balance of the countervailing First Amendment
interests” in the case); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 479 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(using congressional support for corporate campaign spending restrictions to establish a
“longstanding consensus on the need to limit corporate campaign spending”); FEC v. Wis. Right
to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 504 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing “congressional
recognition of the ensuing threat to democratic integrity as reflected in a century of legislation
restricting the electoral leverage of concentrations of money in corporate and union treasuries”);
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003) (referencing “a century of congressional efforts to
curb corporations’ potentially ‘deleterious influences on federal elections’ ”); FEC v. Nat’l Right to
Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (calling for “considerable deference” to Congress in the
area of campaign finance); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822–23 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing long-standing congressional support for corporate campaign
spending restrictions to justify upholding a Massachusetts law).
326. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 407 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (noting that he would “reconsider the question presented here
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Other Congressional Indicators. Apart from legislation, the
popular constitutional interpreter may look to a variety of other
indicators, including congressional practice, Congress’s arguments
inside the courts, and electoral mandates.
Beginning with congressional practice, the interpreter may
examine a long-standing congressional tradition and explore its
relationship to key constitutional questions. Much as in the state and
local government context, the Supreme Court has used congressional
practice in constitutional cases.327 For instance, in Galloway, Justice
Kennedy used the congressional practice of sectarian prayers to justify
their use during town council meetings.328
The Court also provided a recent—and expansive—gloss on the
importance of congressional practice in Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion in NLRB v. Noel Canning. There, while exploring the meaning
of the word “recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause, Breyer looked
to congressional practice—in particular, he studied how the Senate
responded to presidential recess appointments over time.329 In the
end, Justice Breyer used Senate practice to justify a broad reading of
the word “recess”—one that permitted the president to make recess
appointments in a variety of contexts.330
Second, the popular constitutional interpreter may analyze
Congress’s actions inside the courts—namely, the constitutional
arguments advanced by members of Congress in key litigation,
including amicus briefs in important constitutional cases.331 For
instance, the Supreme Court drew attention to a congressional amicus
brief in McDonald v. City of Chicago, with members of Congress
arguing in favor of an individual-rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment.332
if . . . Congress” enacted related digital privacy legislation); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S.
709, 754 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Stolen Valor Act represents the judgment of the
people’s elected representatives that false statements about military awards are very different
from false statements about civilian awards.”); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 493
(2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Congress was presented with compelling evidence that the only
way of preventing these crimes was to target the sale of the videos.”).
327. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 426 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the use of the flag
in a position of honor in government buildings).
328. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 579 (2014) (highlighting that Congress
“continues to permit its . . . chaplains” to use sectarian prayers).
329. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 526–54 (2014) (analyzing the contours of Senate
practice and constitutional debates, including congressional resolutions, existing laws, committee
reports, amicus briefs submitted by leading Senators, and patterns of Senate acquiescence).
330. Id. at 513–14.
331. See Lain, supra note 30, at 1634.
332. 561 U.S. 742, 789 (2010).
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Finally, the popular constitutional interpreter may look to how
members of Congress—and their parties—seek to advance their
constitutional visions through campaigns and speeches. For instance,
she may examine a congressional party’s claim to a popular mandate
for its constitutional vision following a decisive electoral victory.333
This type of argument is not evident in Supreme Court practice, but it
remains a topic of debate in legal scholarship and a possible form of
argument in future cases.
Conclusion. As with presidential constitutional arguments,
those focused on Congress have their limits—especially when made in
isolation. Congressional elections are often much less prominent than
those for the presidency and rarely take on a constitutional
dimension.334 Congress itself is a multimember body—making it more
difficult than in the case of the presidency to identify a unitary
constitutional vision. Congressional leaders are often little known, and
Members of Congress rarely build a public following outside of their
own constituents. Finally, when Congress acts, it often acts in raw
political terms, not constitutional ones.335 And even then, its actions
and inaction only imperfectly reflect the views of the American
people.336
These limits aside, congressional constitutional arguments may
still help an interpreter build a broader popular constitutional
argument. This is especially true when the interpreter is able to find
evidence that the president, the Senate, and the House are all working
to advance a common constitutional vision.337

333. Concededly, wave elections are rare—and wave elections with a constitutional
dimension are even rarer. However, these elections sometimes do take on a constitutional
dimension. See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 178, at 160–206 (exploring the Republican Party’s
mandate following its landslide victory in the election of 1866).
334. See Keith Werhan, Popular Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern, 46 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 65, 123 (2012) (“The People’s vote for or against an incumbent would not necessarily
express popular approval or disapproval of the myriad constitutional judgments of legislators or
presidents in a strongly popular constitutionalist regime.”).
335. See id.
336. See Devins, supra note 40, at 1338 (“The congruence between public policy and public
opinion is roughly sixty percent.”); Werhan, supra note 334, at 123 (noting that “the People and
their representatives are distinct”).
337. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 99–116, 149–51 (providing a powerful example of
this sort of argument by rewriting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States and Harper v. Virginia
State Board of Elections).
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D. Public Opinion Polls
When building a popular constitutional argument, the
interpreter may draw on data from public opinion polls. Though
controversial within constitutional practice, polls offer the popular
constitutional interpreter a quantitative means of assessing popular
views—and, importantly, determining whether the American people
may have reached something approaching a consensus on a given
constitutional issue.
Recent polls may offer a snapshot of the American people’s
current constitutional views, and a series of polls over time might
capture the contours of public opinion and any patterns of
development. For instance, consistent results across several polls over
many years may suggest stable constitutional views. Steady increases
or decreases in support for a given position may suggest a consistent
trend line. And sharp changes in support may suggest a rapidly
shifting debate. Taken together, these data offer the interpreter
another means of determining the depth and breadth of the American
people’s support for a given constitutional position.
Furthermore, by studying opinion polls, the interpreter might
identify instances in which the American people and their elected
officials are out of alignment. For instance, Congress may pass a law
that lacks majority support. The American people may have turned
against a law already on the books. Or the American people may
support a particular action, but the elected branches may not act.
Conversely, the interpreter might strengthen her own constitutional
argument by showing that the American people and their elected
officials have united behind her view.
While public opinion polls remain a controversial source of
authority at the Supreme Court, the Justices sometimes rely on them
as a component of their analysis in constitutional cases. The Supreme
Court offered its most extensive treatment of public opinion polls in
Atkins v. Virginia.338 In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens offered a
state legislation count and national polling data as evidence of a
popular constitutional consensus against the execution of those with
severe mental disabilities.339 Citing a New York Times story and an
amicus brief containing twenty state and national polls, Stevens
concluded:
[P]olling data shows a widespread consensus among Americans, even those who support
the death penalty, that executing the mentally retarded is wrong. Although these

338. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
339. Id. at 313–17.
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factors are by no means dispositive, their consistency with the legislative evidence lends
further support to our conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have
addressed the issue.340

Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie have also studied the wellestablished use of public opinion data in the context of challenges to
campaign finance regulations.341 In these cases, both sides often offer
testimony from competing public opinion experts, with each side
addressing the issue of whether there’s a relationship between
campaign finance and public perceptions of corruption—a key
question under campaign-finance doctrine.342 The Justices have
sometimes drawn on these data in their opinions.343
While public opinion polls are useful, popular constitutional
interpreters should approach them with the requisite level of humility
and caution.344 The interpreter should steer clear of reading too much
into the result of any single poll on a given issue.345 She should also be
on guard for faulty polling methodology—for instance, misleading
questions.346 And even if the interpreter examines a range of trusted
polls showing similar results, interpretive issues remain. Perhaps
most importantly, the interpreter must ask whether the polling
results represent the unreflective views of a sustained majority, or the
American people’s considered judgments.347 To answer this key
question, the interpreter must read public opinion data together with

340. Id. at 316 n.21 (citations omitted).
341. Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance:
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 120–24 (2004).
342. Id. at 128–29.
343. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 461–62 (2015) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (using polling data to support her conclusion
that states should have “leeway to ‘balance the constitutional interests in judicial integrity and
free expression within the unique setting of an elected judiciary’ ” (quoting Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 821 (2002)).
344. See Lain, supra note 24, at 118 (“Public-opinion-poll data can be skewed, depending on
how questions are asked. Institutional support can reflect elite, rather than popular, opinion.”).
345. See David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
859, 863 (2009) (“No one thinks that a court should strike down a law if, for example, more than
50 percent (or any other number) of those who responded to a public opinion poll disapproved of
it.”).
346. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 6–7 (2004); Lain, supra
note 24, at 118 (explaining that identifying the will of the majority can be difficult because of the
risk that opinions may change “depending on how questions are asked”); Benjamin J. Roesch,
Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine, 39
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 420 (2006). Chief Justice Rehnquist highlighted many of these issues in
his rebuke of Justice Stevens’s use of public opinion data in Atkins. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 322–28 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(calling the majority’s use of polling data “[f]eeble”).
347. See Roesch, supra note 346, at 404.
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other indicators of public opinion and place those views in the context
of broader constitutional discourse.
Despite these risks, public opinion polls remain a valuable
resource, and popular constitutional interpreters should not shy away
from polling results that show sustained public support for a
particular constitutional position over time.348 Such findings,
especially when coupled with evidence of public engagement and
deliberation, may serve as a key component of a powerful popular
constitutional argument.349
IV. CRAFTING POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
Taken together, these indicators of public opinion offer the
popular constitutional interpreter a range of materials from which to
build powerful popular constitutional arguments. No single indicator
is a perfect reflection of public opinion. However, together, these
indicators can help the interpreter determine whether the American
people have reached a considered judgment about a given
constitutional issue.
In this Part, I explore ways of crafting powerful popular
constitutional arguments from these indicators. First, I consider
various factors that might strengthen or weaken these arguments,
including constitutional convergence, history, deliberation, and
interbranch custom. And second, I offer a few thoughts on the
relationship between popular constitutionalism and precedent.
A. Ways of Strengthening Popular Constitutional Arguments
When crafting a popular constitutional argument, the popular
constitutional interpreter will often combine the various indicators of
public opinion. However, she will also look to a variety of other factors
that might strengthen (or weaken) her argument, including
constitutional convergence, history, deliberation, and interbranch
custom. I consider each in turn.

348. See Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1227 (“But the public opinion that can
be an input in constitutional reasoning is stable public consensus, not shifting majority
preference.”).
349. See Lain, supra note 24, at 122, 135 (using Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v.
Wade as examples).
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1. Constitutional Convergence
When crafting a popular constitutional argument, the
interpreter might highlight any instances of constitutional
convergence. To that end, she will study the various strands of public
debate over a given constitutional issue and look for any evidence of
cross-ideological overlap in the debate. Reva Siegel350 and Bruce
Ackerman351 both explore this dynamic and its significance to
constitutional development.
Social movements and political parties often mobilize around
high-profile constitutional issues. These issues often divide the
American people ideologically and politically, with mobilization on one
side of the ideological spectrum leading to backlash and
countermobilization on the other side.352 As the debate unfolds, these
divisions often deepen. However, scholars—most notably, Siegel—
have also observed another dynamic often at work.
These patterns of mobilization and countermobilization often
heighten the public’s interest in the issue and spur broader debate and
deliberation. Over time, the public debate often broadens from a small
group of high-profile activists to the wider public. As the debate
widens, each set of activists must address the other side’s strongest
arguments. In the process, each side may attempt to broaden its
appeal, co-opting some of the most popular components of the other
side’s arguments.353 As this process unfolds, the two sides may
converge on a certain set of constitutional baselines—broad principles
that unite both sides, even as opponents may still divide over specific
applications.354
For the popular constitutional interpreter, this form of
constitutional convergence may be strong evidence of popular
consensus—a consensus that she may then seek to translate into
constitutional doctrine. Examples might include constitutional
convergence over gender equality in the 1970s and an individual350. See Siegel, Dead, supra note 16, at 192 (“[T]his Comment shows how Heller’s
originalism enforces understandings of the Second Amendment that were forged in the late
twentieth century through popular constitutionalism.”); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender
and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 299 (2001)
(“Both the ERA and the Nineteenth Amendment demonstrate how the text of the Constitution
makes the terms of our constitutional tradition amenable to contestation by mobilized groups of
citizens, acting inside and outside the formal procedures of the legal system.”).
351. E.g., 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 6 (examining Southern reactions to the Civil
Rights Movement).
352. Siegel, De Facto, supra note 16, at 1362–63.
353. See id. at 1330–31.
354. See Siegel, Dead, supra note 16, at 193–94 (noting the pattern of “mobilization,
countermobilization, coalition, and compromise”).
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rights reading of the Second Amendment in the 2000s.355 In each
instance, the Supreme Court translated constitutional convergence
into official constitutional doctrine.356
The popular constitutional interpreter may also look for other
patterns in public discourse (and opinion). For example, following a
period of extensive public debate, ideological divisions might dissolve,
as key actors defect from one side of the debate to another. For the
popular constitutional interpreter, this may signal that an ideological
consensus on one side of the debate is breaking down, perhaps
signaling a broader shift in the American people’s views. The Supreme
Court recognized this dynamic in Lawrence v. Texas.357 As part of its
analysis, the Court used “substantial and continuing” attacks on
Bowers v. Hardwick by key conservative voices like Charles Fried and
Richard Posner to signal a growing cross-ideological consensus
condemning the criminalization of same-sex sodomy.358
Even more powerfully, one political party may completely
abandon a constitutional debate. For a period of time, a key
constitutional issue—for instance, national regulation of the
economy—may divide the two parties. The parties may run on
competing constitutional visions over the course of a series of
elections. They may carry out public debates on the campaign trail, in
newspapers, and on the radio. And they might fight a series of battles
at the Supreme Court. However, after a series of defeats—both legal
and political—one side (or, at least, many of its mainstream leaders)
may simply surrender, either by co-opting the popular views of its
opponents or by simply abandoning that line of argument. A few diehard traditionalists may stand pat, keeping the old constitutional
faith alive. However, a critical mass will have given up the fight, thus
signaling the end of constitutional debate over a given issue or
principle by the major parties. This form of acquiescence and
consolidation plays a key role in Bruce Ackerman’s theory of
355. See Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1414 (2009) (“In my recent Comment on the decision, I read Heller as
enforcing understandings forged in popular constitutionalism.”); Siegel, supra note 350, at 308–
13 (“[W]e might view mobilization of women for constitutional change as the source of the new
understanding that informed judicial interpretation of the Constitution in the 1970s.”).
356. See Siegel, De Facto, supra note 16, at 1331, 1406 (recognizing that, in the case of the
ERA, the debate over whether legislation was necessary to protect women’s rights provided the
Court with apparent public agreement that women possessed rights under the Equal Protection
Clause); Siegel, supra note 355, at 1414 n.65 (reviewing scholarly works that suggested “Heller
would have been impossible” without the “chang[e] [in] Americans’ minds about the meaning of
the Second Amendment” resulting from the work of organizations initiating debates on the
topic).
357. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
358. Id. at 576.
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constitutional change—for instance, when the Republican Party
eventually accepted the New Deal.359
While constitutional convergence may play an implicit role in
many shifts in constitutional doctrine, we also see explicit evidence of
constitutional convergence in the Supreme Court’s opinions. For
instance, consider McDonnell v. United States, a recent case
addressing allegations of corruption against the former Governor of
Virginia and the scope of a federal anticorruption statute.360
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion for a
unanimous Court.361 As part of his analysis of the statute, he relied on
constitutional convergence in two instances. First, Roberts quoted a
bipartisan amicus brief filed by former White House counsel who
served both parties: “White House counsel who worked in every
administration from that of President Reagan to President Obama
warn that the Government’s ‘breathtaking expansion of publiccorruption law would likely chill federal officials’ interactions with the
people they serve and thus damage their ability effectively to perform
their duties.’ ”362 Second, he cited bipartisan briefs from state
attorneys general offering additional support, explicitly highlighting
the party breakdown for each brief: “Six former Virginia attorneys
general—four Democrats and two Republicans—also filed an amicus
brief in this Court echoing those concerns, as did 77 former state
attorneys general from States other than Virginia—41 Democrats, 35
Republicans, and 1 independent.”363 A unanimous Supreme Court
ultimately followed the advice offered in these bipartisan briefs and
read the statute narrowly.
The Court also turns to constitutional convergence when
analyzing congressional action. For some Justices, bipartisan support
increases the legitimacy of a given statute and strengthens its claim to
speak for an underlying popular constitutional consensus. For
instance, Chief Justice Warren used constitutional convergence as
part of his argument in Katzenbach, stressing the “overwhelming,”
bipartisan votes in favor of the Voting Rights Act.364 Justice Ginsburg
made similar arguments in her Shelby County dissent.365

359. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 178, at 255–311.
360. 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2357–58 (2016).
361. Id. at 2360.
362. Id. at 2372.
363. Id.
364. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308–09, 315 (1966).
365. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 593 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
the “bipartisan” support for the Voting Rights Act’s reauthorization in 2006 and quoting the
Republican House Judiciary Committee Chair, James Sensenbrenner, as a key supporter).
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Finally, we also see constitutional convergence frequently in
legal practice before the Supreme Court. With the rise of Supreme
Court amicus briefs,366 litigants look for ways to stand out from the
avalanche of other filings. In our polarized age, one of the best ways to
signal the legitimacy of one’s constitutional position is through filing a
“strange bedfellows” brief—one that brings together groups, scholars,
government officials, or elected officials from across the ideological
spectrum. We saw an example of the power of this move in Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion in McDonnell. There are many examples of
these filings in a range of other areas in recent years, including
marriage equality367 and the Affordable Care Act.368
In the end, by studying constitutional convergence and
divergence—evidence of social movement activity, political
mobilization, and wider public debate—the popular constitutional
interpreter can gain a better understanding of the depth and breadth
of support for a given constitutional judgment. By examining these
dynamics, the interpreter can either strengthen or weaken her
popular constitutional argument.
2. History
The interpreter may draw on history to strengthen her popular
constitutional argument—whether through historical narrative,
polling patterns, or trends in state legislation on the books. By turning
to history, the interpreter might establish the durability of a given
popular constitutional consensus. While some areas of consensus may
have formed recently (e.g., support for LGBT rights), others might
have a longer historical pedigree (e.g., support for regulating corporate
campaign spending). Historical argument allows the popular
constitutional interpreter to add this time element to her argument.
The Justices often turn to this combination of popular opinion
and history. For instance, Justice Stevens drew on history to build a
powerful popular constitutional argument in his Citizens United
366. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 744 (2000) (“In recent years, one or more amicus
briefs have been filed in 85% of the Court’s argued cases.”).
367. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Republicans Sign Brief in Support of Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/us/politics/prominent-republicanssign-brief-in-support-of-gay-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/V4Q2-BZDY] (using briefs signed by
Republicans in Obergefell to describe a growing bipartisan consensus around marriage equality).
368. See Jonathan H. Adler & Abbe R. Gluck, What the Lawless Obamacare Ruling Means,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/opinion/obamacare-rulingunconstitutional-affordable-care-act.html [https://perma.cc/YZX2-4DBX] (describing a brief
signed by scholars from across the ideological spectrum opposing a recent ruling attacking the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
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dissent. There, Stevens argued that the Court should uphold federal
restrictions on corporate campaign spending.369 To support this
conclusion, he highlighted support for such regulations in Congress
and in “half the state legislatures . . . over many decades”—combining
congressional action, state legislation counting, and history.370 Stevens
also ended his dissent with a powerful popular constitutional
narrative, again drawing on history:
At bottom, the Court’s opinion is . . . a rejection of the common sense of the American
people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining selfgovernment since the founding, and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting
potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange
time to repudiate that common sense. While American democracy is imperfect, few
outside the majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of
corporate money in politics.371

Stevens used public opinion and history to reinforce the set of
traditional constitutional arguments made throughout the rest of his
dissent.372
In the end, by turning to history, the popular constitutional
interpreter can gain a better understanding of the durability (or
novelty) of a given constitutional judgment. Depending on the
findings, this move may either strengthen or weaken the interpreter’s
popular constitutional argument.
3. Deliberation
Constitutional scholars have long argued that the Framers—
and James Madison, in particular—designed our constitutional
system to promote deliberative democracy.373 For constitutional
scholars, these deliberative values often tie back to Madison’s vision
for our constitutional system—with the public and its leaders debating
the most important issues facing the nation, public opinion reflecting
reason (not passion or partisan interest), and these refined views, in
turn, shaping policy.374 This strand of constitutional thought is
369. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 393–480 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
370. Id. at 421 n.46.
371. Id. at 479.
372. Chief Justice Rehnquist made a similar move in Texas v. Johnson. 491 U.S. 397, 426–27
(1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (using the historic symbolism of the American flag to support
his argument that prohibiting the public burning of the flag does not violate the First
Amendment).
373. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 19–20 (1993) (“[T]he American
Constitution was designed to create a deliberative democracy.”).
374. See, e.g., Colleen A. Sheehan, The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison’s “Notes on
Government,” 49 WM. & MARY Q. 609, 625 (1992) (arguing that Madison envisioned a
constitutional system guided by public opinion, but not simply immediate opinion or the
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important to popular constitutionalism and is reflected in Larry
Kramer’s influential account.375
For popular constitutional argument, interpreters may study
the public debate surrounding an issue to determine whether it has
been a topic of ongoing debate and deliberation among the American
people and their political leaders—or not. On the one hand, if the
American people have engaged the issue over time, then the
interpreter can be more confident that the public’s views reflect some
level of thought and debate. This analysis might support popular
constitutional action if this deliberation has led to a consensus, or
inaction if the public remains divided and debate persists. On the
other hand, if the public has not debated the issue over time, then
there is the danger that any public opinion indicators are merely an
unreflective (or unrepresentative) snapshot of the public’s view.
The Justices often use deliberation to either strengthen their
own affirmative popular constitutional argument or expose their
opponents’ position as an elitist attempt to shut down debate and
impose the views of unelected judges on the American people.376 For
instance, in Washington v. Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked
to debates in state legislatures to reject a constitutional right to die.
He stressed the deliberative process in the states, explaining that
state laws touching on a right to die had been “reexamined and,
generally, reaffirmed” in “recent years.”377 He also noted that the
states were still “engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of
physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues.”378 Chief Justice
Rehnquist feared that a Supreme Court ruling in favor of a

preferences of a “factious majority”); Colleen A. Sheehan, Public Opinion and the Formation of
Civic Character in Madison’s Republican Theory, 67 REV. POL. 37, 45 (2005) (describing how the
Framers’ complex system would open up space for a public debate guided by political leaders).
Madison explains this view well in The Federalist. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James
Madison) (explaining that the American constitutional system would “refine and enlarge the
public’s views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom
may best discern the interest of their country”).
375. Kramer, supra note 35, at 748.
376. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 564–65 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing Congress’s “conscientious[ ]” study of the problem of voter discrimination); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002) (“[T]he American public, legislators, scholars, and judges
have deliberated over the question whether the death penalty should ever be imposed on a
mentally retarded criminal. The consensus reflected in those deliberations informs our answer to
the question presented by this case.”); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308–09, 315
(1966) (highlighting the extensiveness of the hearings and the “voluminous legislative history”
underlying the VRA).
377. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 716 (1997).
378. Id. at 719.
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constitutional right to die would short-circuit this deliberative process
and “strike down the considered policy choice of almost every state.”379
In the end, by turning to deliberation, the popular
constitutional interpreter can gain a better understanding of the
amount of public debate underlying popular views on a given
constitutional issue. Depending on the findings, this turn to
deliberation may either strengthen or weaken the interpreter’s
popular constitutional claim.
4. Interbranch Custom
The popular constitutional interpreter may look to interbranch
custom to strengthen her popular constitutional argument.
Interbranch custom refers to instances in which the president and
Congress have settled on a practice that gives life to a particular
constitutional provision. These patterns of action by the elected
branches have proven especially useful in the separation of powers
context—an area in which the Supreme Court has often been
reluctant to adjudicate disputes between two coequal branches of
government. By turning to interbranch custom, the popular
constitutional interpreter might draw authority from the democratic
legitimacy of the people’s elected representatives and their
constitutional authority as officials who have taken an oath to support
the Constitution.380
This approach has a strong historical pedigree—both in
constitutional theory and in Supreme Court practice. For instance, in
the early twentieth century, Karl Llewellyn valued governmental
practice over the Constitution’s text, arguing that “it is only the
practice which can legitimatize the words as being still part of our
going Constitution.”381 Turning to Supreme Court decisionmaking,
Llewellyn added, “Established executive, administrative or legislative
practice the Court merely accepts.”382
In Canning, Justice Breyer offers the most thorough defense—
and the most extensive example—of the Supreme Court’s use of
interbranch custom in recent years. As he explains, “[W]e interpret
the Constitution in light of its text, purposes, and ‘our whole
experience’ as a Nation. And we look to the actual practice of
Government to inform our interpretation.”383
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1934).
Id. at 31.
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 557 (2014) (citation omitted).
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Justice Breyer links this method back to two of the most
important constitutional figures in the early republic—James Madison
and John Marshall. Beginning with Madison, Justice Breyer draws on
Madison’s reflections on how interpreters might use governmental
practice to settle the Constitution’s meaning over time:
As James Madison wrote, it “was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that
difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding [the] terms
& phrases necessarily used in [the] charter . . . and that it might require a regular
course of practice to liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.”384

Madison’s vision is central to Justice Breyer’s approach to interbranch
custom in Canning.
Justice Breyer also turns to Chief Justice Marshall and a
canonical case, McCulloch v. Maryland, for constitutional authority.
Consistent with Madison’s insight, Marshall called on judges to rely
on governmental practice to help settle constitutional disputes:
[A] doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause, and the human judgment
be suspended, in the decision of which the great principles of liberty are not concerned,
but the respective powers of those who are equally the representatives of the people, are
to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the practice of the government, ought to receive a
considerable impression from that practice.385

In Canning, Justice Breyer instructs interpreters to first
analyze the Constitution’s text. If the text is dispositive, then that is
the end of the inquiry. However, if the text is susceptible to multiple
readings, then the interpreter might refer to interbranch custom to
help settle the constitutional dispute. After analyzing the
Constitution’s text, Justice Breyer concludes that the Recess
Appointments Clause is ambiguous and then uses interbranch custom
to help determine its meaning and scope.386 We reviewed parts of
Justice Breyer’s analysis in Section III.B—an analysis that draws on
presidential practice, Senate acquiescence, and legal arguments (and
actions) by both branches.
In the end, Justice Breyer reads the use of the word “recess”
broadly, permitting recess appointments during intrasession recesses
and for vacancies that arise while the Congress is still in session.387
However, he also concedes that he may have reached a different
conclusion if he had ignored interbranch custom and relied on the

384. Id. at 525 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 447, 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908)); see also William Baude,
Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019).
385. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819).
386. Canning, 573 U.S. at 527–28.
387. Id. at 538.
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Constitution’s text alone.388 For Justice Breyer, interbranch custom
has real interpretive bite.
In the end, by considering interbranch custom, the popular
constitutional interpreter can focus on instances in which the elected
branches have reached a constitutional settlement on the application
of the Constitution’s text. Of course, interbranch custom has its
limitations. Custom may reflect genuine agreement between the
branches. However, congressional acquiescence does not always mean
that a congressional majority supports a presidential practice. Even
when a position has majority support, Congress often has difficulty
acting—whether because of a crowded agenda, the institution’s veto
gates, or a mere preference for constitutional shirking.389
Nevertheless, when the interpreter identifies evidence that the
elected branches have reached a constitutional settlement, she might
draw on this settlement to strengthen her popular constitutional
argument. And conversely, interbranch conflict might undermine any
claims of a popular constitutional consensus.
B. Precedent and Popular Constitutionalism
Finally, a quick word on precedent. A new popular
constitutional consensus may push courts down a new doctrinal
path—breathing new life into an old constitutional provision,
identifying a new fundamental right, or closing off a line of precedent.
However, the popular mandate giving life to this new construction is
but the beginning of an unfolding legal process, as courts attempt to
translate that popular constitutional understanding into doctrine. In
this sense, popular constitutional consensus may set a new agenda—
an individual-rights reading of the Second Amendment, for instance—
but then it is up to the courts to construct a doctrine to implement
that new value in the courts.
Popular constitutional judges looking to start down a new
doctrinal path should be conscious of their place in the constitutional
life cycle. When beginning to shift constitutional doctrine in a new
direction, such a judge should issue minimalist decisions tightly
linked to the facts of a given case and the specifics of the
constitutional consensus that has crystallized around it.390 Such

388. Id. at 527.
389. Even Justice Breyer conceded as much. Id. at 532.
390. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 61–72 (1999) (explaining that this practice allows continued public debate on the broader
topic); Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 YALE L.J. 1977, 1982–83 (2006)
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rulings should clearly leave open the possibility of future doctrinal
developments and ongoing democratic deliberation.391
This kind of approach would allow for easy midcourse
corrections in the face of public backlash392 and, therefore, guard
against moving too far, too fast based on a single reading of public
consensus on a given issue.393 This would also permit additional
debate among legal elites, judges, elected officials, and the American
people, as new cases in the lower courts and additional social
mobilization further focus the public’s attention, heighten public
engagement, and clarify any practical implications of the new
construction.394
In the end, the popular constitutional judge should approach
shifts in constitutional doctrine with caution.395 She should pause
before recognizing a new constitutional consensus about a given issue,
limit the early wave of cases to their specific facts and to paradigmatic
applications of the new construction, and leave doctrinal room for
backtracking in the face of public outrage.
V. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT—A CASE STUDY:
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES AND MARRIAGE EQUALITY
To see how popular constitutional argument might work in a
recent case, I end by contrasting the reasoning in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges396 with how a popular constitutional
interpreter might have addressed marriage equality. Scholars are no
doubt right that public opinion writ large influenced the Justices on

(describing the different ways that a constitutional provision may apply to a set of facts
depending on the analysis used by the Court).
391. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 390, at 24–45, 61–72 (outlining the connection between
minimalism and democracy); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 14, 99 (1996) (“Minimalist judges try to keep their judgments as narrow and as
incompletely theorized as possible.”).
392. See Amar, supra note 52, at 1782 (“If judges may properly strike down highly unusual
state (or even federal) laws . . . will government innovation and experimentation be unduly
stifled . . . ? Not if the judges proceed with caution and humility . . . .”).
393. See Coan, supra note 12, at 238 (asserting that judges should practice “judicial
restraint” when deciding cases based on public outrage); Strauss, supra note 345, at 868–69
(explaining how Furman’s decision that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied may
have been attributed to diminishing public support for capital punishment, which was later
revitalized as states enacted new death penalty statutes).
394. See Lain, supra note 24, at 183 (asserting that, even if the Court reaches the wrong
decision in a case, this may “forc[e] public debate over contested constitutional questions”);
Sunstein, supra note 391, at 99 (stating that minimalism helps to “maximize the space for
democratic deliberation about basic political and moral issues”).
395. See Amar, supra note 52, at 1782.
396. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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this issue,397 but the opinion itself—its reasoning and its craft—can
also be analyzed from a popular constitutional perspective, especially
when placed in dialogue with Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent.
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision striking
down state same-sex marriage bans.398 Justice Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion in the case, and it combines traditional legal analysis
with Justice Kennedy’s usual commitment to “dignity” and “liberty.”399
However, he does strike some popular constitutional notes as part of
his analysis, drawing on traditional forms of popular constitutional
argument.
For instance, he relies on indicators of state lawmaking and
practice. Beginning with state legislation, Justice Kennedy collects
“State Legislation . . . Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage” in an Appendix
to his Obergefell opinion.400 However, the Appendix lists only twelve
laws, which suggests the weakness of his state constitutional
argument.401
Justice Kennedy also uses examples of state lawmaking and
practice to reinforce his own constitutional conclusions—in many
cases, using state actions to establish constitutionally relevant facts.
For instance, Justice Kennedy uses state adoption laws as “powerful
confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create
loving, supportive families.”402 He similarly argues that state laws
providing benefits to married couples “have contributed to the
fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that
institution at the center of so many facets of the legal and social
order.”403 Given this treatment of marriage by the states, when states
exclude same-sex couples from the institution, they “impose stigma
and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.”404
Justice Kennedy also draws on historical narrative to place the
debate over marriage equality in context. In the process, he offers an
account of the LGBT rights movement that builds on that social
movement’s history and highlights the extent to which the issue of
marriage equality has been the topic of public debate for years—a
fusion of history and deliberation that strengthens the popular
397. See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17–93 (2016) (describing the history of the fight for legality of same-sex
marriage in the United States).
398. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
399. Id. at 2585.
400. Id. at 2611 app. B.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 2600.
403. Id. at 2601.
404. Id. at 2602.
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constitutional dimensions of his opinion.405 The main thrust of Justice
Kennedy’s narrative is clear: there has been an undeniable trend in
favor of LGBT rights (and marriage equality) over time. And some of
his most powerful passages use deliberative argument—passages that
show that key changes in society, politics, and law reflected a national
debate over LGBT rights and marriage equality. In the process,
Justice Kennedy explicitly ties arguments made at the Supreme Court
to the insights gleaned from these debates.406
Justice Kennedy links the legitimacy of constitutional change
(and the recognition of new rights) to changes in society-wide public
opinion—a classic popular constitutional move. He observes: “[R]ights
come not from ancient sources alone. They arise, too, from a better
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a
liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”407 Justice Kennedy adds,
“[I]n interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has
recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal
unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that
once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”408 It is the Court’s duty to
“[r]espond to” this “new awareness.”409
Despite these strong gestures towards popular constitutional
argument, Justice Kennedy is ultimately fuzzy on how the Court
should go about recognizing “new insights and societal
understandings.”410 In the end, he returns to judicial authority and
argues that the Court must ultimately exercise its own independent
judgment—shaped by “new insights” gleaned by the current
generation, but ultimately settled by the independent legal reasoning
of judges “in the formal discourse of the law.”411 For instance, stressing
the Court’s countermajoritarian mission, Justice Kennedy explains, “It
is of no moment whether advocates of same-sex marriage now enjoy or
lack momentum in the democratic process. The issue before the Court
here is the legal question whether the Constitution protects the right
of same-sex couples to marry.”412 In the end, Justice Kennedy’s vision
risks leaving judges—not the American people—in the drivers’ seat.

405. Id. at 2595–97.
406. Id. at 2605 (using powerful language to highlight the extent of the debate over marriage
equality).
407. Id. at 2602.
408. Id. at 2603.
409. See id. at 2604.
410. Id. at 2603.
411. Id. at 2588.
412. Id. at 2606 (emphasis added).
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This countermajoritarian turn leaves Justice Kennedy
vulnerable to attack on multiple fronts, including key popular
constitutional fronts, even as Justice Kennedy could easily lay claim to
enforcing a newly emerging popular constitutional consensus. Chief
Justice Roberts exploits this opening, in a dissent that ties a call for
judicial restraint to many strands of popular constitutional
argument.413
For instance, Chief Justice Roberts strikes many popular
constitutional chords in the following passage—one of his most
powerful—combining deliberative argument, state legislation
counting, history, and the dangers of judicial supremacy:
Supporters of same-sex marriage have achieved considerable success persuading their
fellow citizens—through the democratic process—to adopt their view. That ends today.
Five lawyers have closed the debate and enacted their own vision of marriage as a
matter of constitutional law. . . . [T]he Court invalidates the marriage laws of more than
half the States and orders the transformation of a social institution that has formed the
basis of human society for millennia . . . . Just who do we think we are?414

Throughout his dissent, the Chief Justice also references public
opinion,415 acknowledges ongoing public debate,416 draws on state
legislation counting,417 and places these state legislation counts in the
context of a broader history of limiting marriage to a man and a
woman throughout American history.418
While the Chief Justice’s dissent ultimately turns on other
factors—namely, his conclusion that the Constitution does not speak
to marriage equality—it often reads like a constitutional law lesson for
lawyers, law students, and ordinary citizens, linking Obergefell to
previous instances of judicial overreach like Lochner.419 Justice
Kennedy’s emphasis on countermajoritarian reasoning and
independent legal judgment play into the Chief Justice’s hands—
strengthening this attack.
To be clear, the Chief Justice’s popular constitutional
arguments are, themselves, open to popular constitutional
counterarguments. While Justice Kennedy makes an easy target for a

413. Id. at 2611–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
414. Id. at 2611–12.
415. Id. at 2615 (“Over the last few years, public opinion on marriage has shifted rapidly.”).
416. Id. at 2624–25 (praising the debate over marriage equality).
417. Id. at 2614, 2615, 2626.
418. Id. at 2614 (“There is no dispute that every State at the founding—and every State
throughout our history until a dozen years ago—defined marriage in the traditional, biologically
rooted way.”).
419. Id. at 2615–16 (“In reality . . . the majority’s approach has no basis in principle or
tradition, except for the unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking that characterized
discredited decisions such as Lochner . . .”); see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Lochnerizing assault, popular constitutional argument offers a
principled response to the Chief Justice—one tied to concrete
indicators of public opinion, not a judge’s own independent moral
judgments.
For instance, the Chief Justice’s dissent leaves the impression
that the Supreme Court was imposing an unpopular opinion on the
American people—and Justice Kennedy left himself susceptible to that
argument by stressing his use of independent legal reasoning.
However, even if Chief Justice Roberts is right that the Constitution
does not speak on the issue,420 and that, therefore, there is no judicial
role here except for deference—it is simply not true that the Court was
imposing an unpopular decision on the American people. Public
opinion evidence demonstrated majority support for marriage equality
and tracking polls suggested a strengthening trend in that
direction.421
Or, take the issue of unenumerated rights. Chief Justice
Roberts is right that there is “no ‘Companionship and Understanding’
or ‘Nobility and Dignity’ Clause in the Constitution.”422 He is also
right to warn about the dangers of unconstrained judicial
policymaking—that “[a]llowing unelected judges to select which
unenumerated rights rank as ‘fundamental’ . . . raises obvious
concerns about the judicial role.”423 However, popular constitutional
argument provides concrete indicators for discerning public opinion.
Furthermore, the Constitution’s text—namely, the Ninth Amendment
and the Fourteenth Amendment—may provide a warrant for
protecting rights actually deemed fundamental by the American
people even if they are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.
Finally, while Roberts suggests that Glucksberg and its focus on
history and tradition is the best approach to unenumerated rights,424
popular constitutional argument offers an alternative—one that
provides the Justices with a means of tying the recognition of a new
right to the commands of the American people.

420. And he’s not.
421. See Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbianrights.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XS52-WCGR] (showing majority support
(sixty-one percent) for marriage equality in 2016—rising to sixty-seven percent by 2018).
422. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
423. See also id. (“[A] Justice’s commission does not confer any specific moral, philosophical,
or social insight sufficient to justify imposing those perceptions on fellow citizens under the
pretense of ‘due process.’ ”).
424. Id. at 2622–23 (“The purpose of insisting that implied fundamental rights have roots in
the history and tradition of our people is to ensure that when unelected judges strike down
democratically enacted laws, they do so based on something more than their own beliefs . . . .”).
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Of course, different popular constitutional interpreters might
have reached different conclusions in Obergefell. For those
interpreters joining Justice Kennedy in striking down same-sex
marriage bans, they might emphasize public opinion data showing
majority support for marriage equality, trends in public opinion
reinforcing that result (with support continuing to grow), and evidence
of a crumbling consensus against marriage equality, with marriage
equality becoming orthodoxy on the political left and increasing
support for marriage equality even among some establishment figures
on the political right.
Some popular constitutional interpreters may have been open
to upholding same-sex marriage bans when they clearly divided the
public and there was strong (and unified) support for these bans on
the right. However, with this support weakening and a bipartisan
consensus in opposition emerging, they might have become more open
to striking these bans down—perhaps combining some of the tools of
popular constitutional argument with other constitutional modalities
to reach that conclusion.425 Still others might have excluded cases
involving alleged discrimination against minorities from popular
constitutional analysis altogether and instead might have looked to
other constitutional arguments to resolve this case.
Finally, for those interpreters joining the dissenters in
upholding the same-sex marriage bans, they might have looked at
many of the same indicators of public opinion highlighted by Chief
Justice Roberts and concluded that the debate is still ongoing. From
this perspective, neither side has secured a sustained, crossideological consensus. Therefore, these interpreters might have simply
deferred to the elected branches, allowed a diversity of approaches at
the state level, and permitted the debate to go on.
As with any constitutional methodology, popular constitutional
argument does not dictate any particular outcome in a given case.
Nevertheless, the indicators of public opinion may provide a
framework for assessing whether popular constitutional argument has
any force.
CONCLUSION
Popular constitutionalism—as a matter of both theory and
practice—remains a work in progress. In this Article, I have sought to

425. See Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1228 (suggesting that “the content of
equal protection shifted as public opinion moved away from a once-solid consensus dismissing
the possibility of same-sex marriage”).
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provide a framework for understanding the role that popular
constitutional consensus might play inside the courts. In the process, I
have explored the relationship between popular constitutional
argument, the existing popular constitutionalism literature, and longstanding debates in constitutional theory. And I have sought to offer
the interpreter a concrete framework for crafting popular
constitutional arguments—cataloguing various indicators of public
opinion and offering examples of how to use popular constitutional
analysis to address today’s constitutional questions.
While this Article makes a start, much work remains.

